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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Many states are imposing new and often onerous “user fees” on individuals with criminal convic-
tions. Yet far from being easy money, these fees impose severe – and often hidden – costs on com-
munities, taxpayers, and indigent people convicted of crimes. They create new paths to prison for 
those unable to pay their debts and make it harder to find employment and housing as well to meet 
child support obligations. 
This report examines practices in the fifteen states with the highest prison populations, which to-
gether account for more than 60 percent of all state criminal filings. We focused primarily on the 
proliferation of “user fees,” financial obligations imposed not for any traditional criminal justice 
purpose such as punishment, deterrence, or rehabilitation but rather to fund tight state budgets.  
Across the board, we found that states are introducing new user fees, rais-
ing the dollar amounts of existing fees, and intensifying the collection of 
fees and other forms of criminal justice debt such as fines and restitution. 
But in the rush to collect, made all the more intense by the fiscal crises in 
many states, no one is considering the ways in which the resulting debt 
can undermine reentry prospects, pave the way back to prison or jail, and 
result in yet more costs to the public.
Key Findings  
•   Fees, while often small in isolation, regularly total hundreds and 
even thousands of dollars of debt. All fifteen of the examined states 
charge a broad array of fees, which are often imposed without taking 
into account ability to pay. One person in Pennsylvania faced $2,464 in 
fees alone, approximately three times the amount imposed for fines and 
restitution. In some states, local government fees, on top of state-wide 
fees, add to fee burdens. Thirteen of the fifteen states also charge poor 
people public defender fees simply for exercising their constitutional 
right to counsel. This practice can push defendants to waive counsel, 
raising constitutional questions and leading to wrongful convictions, 
over-incarceration, and significant burdens on the operation of the 
courts.
•   Inability to pay leads to more fees and an endless cycle of debt. Fourteen of the fifteen states also 
utilize “poverty penalties” – piling on additional late fees, payment plan fees, and interest when 
individuals are unable to pay their debts all at once, often enriching private debt collectors in the 
process. Some of the collection fees are exorbitant and exceed ordinary standards of fairness. For 
example, Alabama charges a 30 percent collection fee, while Florida permits private debt collectors 
to tack on a 40 percent surcharge to underlying debt.
• California
• Texas
• Florida
• New York
• Georgia
• Ohio
• Pennsylvania
• Michigan
• Illinois
• Arizona
• North Carolina
• Louisiana
• Virginia
• Alabama
• Missouri 
Source: National Prisoner Statistics,  
Bureau of Justice Statistics
States Covered
(in order of number of persons in prison)
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•   Although “debtors’ prison” is illegal in all states, reincarcerating individuals for failure to pay 
debt is, in fact, common in some – and in all states new paths back to prison are emerging for 
those who owe criminal justice debt. All fifteen of the states examined in this report have jurisdic-
tions that arrest people for failing to pay debt or appear at debt-related hearings. Many states also 
use the threat of probation or parole revocation or incarceration for contempt as a debt-collection 
tool, and in some jurisdictions, individuals may also “choose” to go to jail as a way to reduce their 
debt burdens. Some of these practices violate the Constitution or state law. All of them undercut 
former offenders’ efforts to reintegrate into their communities. Yet even though over-incarceration 
harms individuals and communities and pushes state budgets to the brink, states continue to send 
people back to prison or jail for debt-related reasons.
•   As states increasingly structure their budgets around fee revenue, they only look at one side 
of the ledger. Strikingly, there is scant information about what aggressive collection efforts cost the 
state.  Debt collection involves myriad untabulated expenses, including salaried time from court 
staff, correctional authorities, and state and local government employees. Arresting and incarcerat-
ing people for debt-related reasons are particularly costly, especially for sheriffs’ offices, local jails, 
and for the courts themselves. For example, Brennan Center analysis of one North Carolina coun-
ty’s collection efforts found that in 2009 the government arrested 564 individuals and jailed 246 
of them for failing to pay debt and update address information, but that the amount it ultimately 
collected from this group was less than what it spent on their incarceration.    
•   Criminal justice debt significantly hobbles a person’s chances to 
reenter society successfully after a conviction. In all fifteen of the 
examined states, criminal justice debt and related collection prac-
tices create a significant barrier for individuals seeking to rebuild 
their lives after a criminal conviction. For example, eight of the fif-
teen states suspend driving privileges for missed debt payments, a 
practice that can make it impossible for people to work and that 
can lead to new convictions for driving with a suspended license. 
Seven states require individuals to pay off criminal justice debt be-
fore they can regain their eligibility to vote. And in all fifteen states, 
criminal justice debt and associated collection practices can damage 
credit and interfere with other commitments, such as child support 
obligations.  
•   Overdependence on fee revenue compromises the traditional functions of courts and cor-
rectional agencies. When courts are pressured to act, in essence, as collection arms of the state, 
their traditional independence suffers. When probation and parole officers must devote time to fee 
collection instead of public safety and rehabilitation, they too compromise their roles.  
All of these policies are at odds with America’s growing commitment to reduce recidivism and over-
incarceration, and to promote reentry for those who have been convicted of crimes. As states look 
to ways to shave their prison and jail budgets without compromising public safety, eliminating the 
debt-based routes back to jail – both direct and indirect – is an obvious choice for reform.
• Incarcerating those who have failed to  
   pay 
•  Extending probation and other supervi-
sion in order to collect fees
•  Suspending driver’s licenses for failure 
to pay
Top Penny-Wise, Pound-Foolish Practices
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Core Recommendations  
  
In light of these findings, this report makes the following recommendations for reforming the use of 
user fees and the collection of criminal justice debt in state and local policy environments: 
•	 	Lawmakers	should	evaluate	the	total	debt	burden	of	existing	fees	before	adding	new	fees	or	in-
creasing fee amounts.  
•	 	Indigent	defendants	should	be	exempt	from	user	fees,	and	payment	plans	and	other	debt	collec-
tion efforts should be tailored to an individual’s ability to pay. 
•	 	States	should	immediately	cease	arresting	and	incarcerating	individuals	for	failure	to	pay	criminal	
justice debt, particularly before a court has made an ability-to-pay determination. 
•	 	Public	defender	fees	should	be	eliminated,	to	reduce	pressures	that	can	lead	to	conviction	of	the	
innocent, over-incarceration, and violations of the Constitution.
•	 	States	should	eliminate	“poverty	penalties”	that	impose	additional	costs	on	individuals	who	are	
unable to pay criminal justice debt all at once, such as payment plan fees, late fees, collection fees, 
and interest.
•	 	Policymakers	should	evaluate	the	costs	of	popular	debt	collection	methods	such	as	arrests,	in-
carceration, and driver’s license suspensions – including the salary and time spent by employees 
involved in collection and the effect of these methods on reentry and recidivism.  
•	 	Agencies	involved	in	debt	collection	should	extend	probation	terms	or	suspend	driver’s	licenses	only	
in those cases where an individual can afford to repay criminal justice debt but refuses to do so. 
•	 	Legislatures	should	eliminate	poll	taxes	that	deny	individuals	the	right	to	vote	when	they	are	un-
able to pay criminal justice debt.
•	 	Courts	should	offer	community	service	programs	that	build	job	skills	for	individuals	unable	to	
afford criminal justice debt.
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INTRODUCTION
Cash-strapped states have increasingly turned to user fees to fund their criminal justice systems, as well 
as to provide general budgetary support. States now charge defendants for everything from probation 
supervision, to jail stays, to the use of a constitutionally-required public defender. Every stage of the 
criminal justice process, it seems, has become ripe for a surcharge.
These “user fees” differ from other kinds of court-imposed financial obligations. Unlike fines, whose 
purpose is to punish, and restitution, whose purpose is to compensate victims, user fees are explicitly 
intended to raise revenue. Sometimes deployed as an eleventh hour maneuver to close a state budget gap, 
the decision to raise or create new user fees is rarely made with much deliberation or thought about the 
consequences.
As this report documents, however, the consequences of imposing and collecting user fees, and other 
forms of criminal justice debt such as fines and restitution, are significant. 
This report discusses the national landscape of criminal justice debt and collection practices by 
surveying the fifteen states with the largest prison populations. Individuals incarcerated in these fifteen 
states represent 69 percent of all state prisoners nationally, and these states together have more than 
60 percent of all state criminal filings.1 Over the course of a year, we researched relevant laws and 
court rules and spoke with more than 100 court officials, public defenders, and others involved in the 
criminal justice system, to understand how these laws and rules operate in practice. We focused on how 
and when criminal justice debt is imposed on individuals, and which collection mechanisms are used 
in each of the states studied.  
What emerges is a disturbing uptick in both the dollar amount and the number of criminal justice fees 
imposed on offenders, as well as increased pressure on officials to collect fees, fines, and other forms 
of criminal justice debt. The result is a broad array of collateral consequences that policy makers have 
seldom considered in the rush to raise revenue.  
Fees and other criminal justice debt are typically levied on a population uniquely unable to make payments. 
Criminal defendants are overwhelmingly poor. It is estimated that 80-90 percent of those charged with 
criminal offenses qualify for indigent defense.2 Nearly 65 percent of those incarcerated in the U.S. did 
not receive a high school diploma;3 70 percent of prisoners function at the lowest literacy levels.4 African-
Americans face a particularly severe burden: Nationally, African-Americans comprise 13 percent of the 
population but 28 percent of those arrested and 40 percent of those incarcerated,5 and African-Americans 
are almost five times more likely than white defendants to rely on indigent defense counsel.6 
Individuals emerging from prison often face significant challenges meeting basic needs. Many are 
unable to find stable housing – it is estimated that 15 to 27 percent of prisoners expect to go to 
homeless shelters upon their release.7 Many used drugs or alcohol regularly before going to prison and 
may need treatment upon release.8
Employment rates for those coming out of prison are also notoriously low – up to 60 percent of former 
inmates are unemployed one year after release.9 Obstacles to finding a job are even greater now, as the 
unemployment rate in the general population hovers at just under 10 percent, and is as high as 16 percent 
for industries such as construction that have traditionally been sources of jobs for persons with criminal 
convictions.10 
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Against this backdrop, criminal justice debt adds yet one more barrier to getting on one’s feet. What at 
first glance appears to be easy money for the state can carry significant hidden costs – both human and 
financial – for individuals, for the government, and for the community at large. When persons with 
convictions are unable to pay their debts, they face a cascade of consequences. Late fees, interest, and other 
“poverty penalties” accrue. In many states, driver’s licenses are suspended for missed payments, thereby 
stripping individuals of a legal means of traveling to work. Damaged credit can make it difficult to find 
employment or housing.  
Worse yet, in many ways, when states impose debt that cannot be paid they are charting a path back to 
prison. Debt-related mandatory court appearances and probation and parole conditions leave debtors 
vulnerable for violations that result in a new form of debtors’ prison. Suspended driver’s licenses lead to 
criminal sanctions if debtors continue to drive. Aggressive collection tactics can disrupt employment, 
make it difficult to meet other obligations such as child support, and lead to financial insecurity – all of 
which can lead to recidivism.    
In recent years, there has been a growing consensus that we need to be smarter, not necessarily tougher, 
in fighting crime. It is in everyone’s interest to ensure that formerly incarcerated persons successfully 
reenter society – and scholars, advocates, religious leaders, and those who have spent time in prison have 
forcefully argued for more sensible policies that foster reintegration, rather than recidivism. More than 
two-thirds of nonviolent offenders released from state prison are rearrested within three years.11 Bipartisan 
federal legislation enacted in 2008, the Second Chance Act, seeks to better meet the needs of the formerly 
incarcerated and thereby break this vicious cycle.12 And the same budgetary forces that have prompted 
new user fees have also prompted a reexamination of expensive mass incarceration as a crime-fighting 
technique.  
It is time to reconsider the wisdom of turning persons with criminal convictions into debtors. As this 
report demonstrates, the hidden costs of imposing and collecting user fees and other forms of criminal 
justice debt are profound.
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California: Charges extra $300 
for failure to pay fines.
Texas: Some jurisdictions 
arrest individuals who fall 
behind on payments.
Florida: Private collection 
agencies add up to a 40% 
surcharge on amounts collected.
Pennsylvania: Denies parole to 
individuals who cannot afford to pay 
a $60 fee.
Georgia: Some jurisdictions 
arrest individuals for failing to 
appear at debt-related 
proceedings.
Ohio: Many courts do not 
routinely waive fines and costs 
for indigence.
Michigan: Many jurisdic-
tions revoke probation or 
hold contempt proceedings 
for failure to pay debt.
New York: Has consistently 
increased the size and number 
of fees since the 1990s.
Illinois: Some judges use 
an unreasonable standard for 
determining ability to pay.
Virginia: Many jurisdictions 
suspend driver's licenses for 
missed payments.
North Carolina: Imposes 
mandatory charges for the 
cost of public defenders.
Arizona: Has no community 
service option for paying off debt.
Louisiana: Orleans district 
charges $100 simply to enter into 
a payment plan.
Missouri: Allows individuals to 
"volunteer" to sit in jail to pay off 
debt.
Alabama: Requires all criminal 
justice debt to be paid before 
right to vote is restored after 
certain felony convictions.
Criminal Justice Debt Across the Country
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Across the country, individuals face an increasing number of “user fees” as part of their criminal cases. 
These fees are often imposed on top of other forms of criminal justice debt, such as fines and restitution, 
and can add up to staggering totals.
In only the past few years, most of the fifteen states studied by the Brennan Center have increased both 
the number and dollar value of criminal justice fees, sometimes significantly. For example:
  
•	 Florida has added more than 20 new categories of financial obligations to the criminal justice process 
since 1996 and has increased existing fees in both of the last two years. It recently increased court 
costs for felonies by $25, required costs of prosecution to be imposed on convicted persons regardless 
of their ability to pay (minimum $50 for misdemeanors and $100 for felonies), and set minimum 
mandatory recoupment fees for persons who use public defenders at $50 for misdemeanors and $100 
for felonies.13 
•	 New York has been increasing the size and number of fees since the 1990s.14 In 2008, the 
legislature introduced new surcharges for various driving offenses, ranging from $20 to $170 
dollars.15 It also increased existing surcharges, some by as much as $50.16
•	 North Carolina in 2009 instituted a $25 late fee for failure to pay a fine or other court cost 
on time and a $20 surcharge to set up an installment payment plan. It also doubled the fee 
for a failure to appear in court (to $200), and the fee imposing lab costs on defendants (to 
$600).17
While fees grow year after year, policymakers 
seemingly have failed to evaluate, or even 
consider, what these new assessments mean 
for individuals’ total debt burdens.  
A. Debt Adds Up Quickly
In the fifteen states examined in this report, 
fees span the criminal process and often begin to accrue before a defendant even reaches the courthouse. 
For instance, many states charge indigent defendants a fee simply to apply for a public defender. Once 
a person secures a defender, he or she may be charged a reimbursement fee for the costs of defense 
services.
A conviction can also bring financial penalties. Many crimes carry a fine, and most states impose fine 
“surcharges” that go either to state coffers or to criminal justice or crime victim funds. A person may 
also be forced to pay a range of court administrative fees just for being convicted or pleading guilty.  
If a person is then placed in prison or jail, he or she often faces fees to defray costs associated with incarceration. 
If placed on probation, or released from incarceration on parole, in most cases individuals are charged 
monthly supervision fees as well.  
In the fifteen surveyed states, individual fees, small and large, add up quickly, leaving many poor individuals 
with heavy debt burdens that they often cannot hope to pay. 
I.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT IS GROWING AT AN ALARMING 
RATE ACROSS THE COUNTRY 
15 of 15 states impose fees that attach upon conviction18
15 of 15 states impose parole, probation or other supervision fees19
15 of 15 states have laws authorizing the imposition of jail or prison fees20
By the Numbers
8  |  Brennan Center for Justice
Criminal Justice Debt Accrues 
at Every Stage of a Criminal Proceeding21
Pre-conviction
Application fee to  
obtain public defender
Jail fee for pretrial  
incarceration
Incarceration
Prison fees
Jail fees Probation, Parole,  
or Other Supervision 
Probation and parole supervision fees
Drug testing fees
Vehicle interlock device fees (DUIs)
Mandatory treatment, therapy, and class fees
Poverty Penalties 
Interest
Late fees
Payment plan fees
Collection fees
Sentencing
Fines, with accompanying surcharges
Restitution
Fees for court administrative costs
Fees for designated funds  
(e.g. libraries, prison construction, etc.) 
Public defender reimbursement fees
Prosecution reimbursement fees
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According to one recent docket sheet shown below, for example, a Pennsylvania woman convicted of 
a drug crime incurred 26 different fees, ranging from $2 to $345. When her financial obligations are 
added together, she faces $2,464 in fees alone, an amount that is approximately three times larger than 
both her fine ($500) and restitution ($325) combined.
Docket Sheet Snapshot, Pennsylvania
This is an excerpt of a docket sheet from the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. This defendant was convicted under 35 Pa. Cons. 
Stat  Ann. § 780-113(30) (the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance). She was 
sentenced to a minimum of three months and a maximum of 23 months imprisonment, a fine of $500, and restitution totaling $325. Her 
total fees are $2,464.91.
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This is not an unusual case. In Texas, a preliminary study by the Texas Office of Court Administration 
showed that people released to parole owe anywhere from $500 to $2,000 in offense-related debt (not 
including restitution).21 A chart used by court clerks in Texas inventories at least 39 different categories 
of court costs in misdemeanor cases and 35 types of costs in felony cases.22 In Arizona, individuals 
face a series of surcharges that add 84 percent to their underlying fines and penalties.23 Individuals are 
also liable for additional “set amount” surcharges, including a $20 probation surcharge24 and a $20 
surcharge for using a payment plan to pay off debts.25
Adding to the burden are fees that apply only in certain local jurisdictions, authorized either by state 
statute or imposed directly by local governments.26 In Louisiana, for example, defendants in Jefferson 
Parish face an additional “special court cost” of $75 for a felony conviction and $25 for a misdemeanor 
conviction.27 And in New York, some counties have reportedly collected additional probation-related 
fees even though such fees are not permitted under state law.28  
In addition to user fees that apply to all offenses, individuals convicted of certain types of crimes 
frequently face substantial additional debt. For instance, in many states, individuals convicted of drug 
crimes, driving under the influence (“DUI”), or sex offenses face mandatory fees that dramatically 
increase their overall debt. In Arizona, for example, a person convicted of DUI must pay special fees 
totaling $1,000, on top of all other fees and a fine of $250.29  
Individuals can also face high fees for the cost of monitoring systems. In North Carolina, a person 
convicted of a DUI can be assessed up to $1,000 for the use of a continuous alcohol monitoring system 
as a condition of probation,30 and many states also require individuals convicted of DUIs to pay for a 
vehicle interlock device.31 Texas and Illinois also impose fees for sex offender monitoring, with Illinois 
law instructing courts to charge offenders for “all costs.”32 
Together, these fees can add up to a debt burden that is impossibly high for many poor people convicted 
of crimes.
B. States Fail to Track the Real Costs 
Despite the dramatic increase in the number of criminal justice fees, none of the fifteen states studied 
had any kind of process for measuring the impact of criminal justice debt and related collection 
practices on former offenders, their families, or their communities. And even though fees are imposed 
as a revenue-generating measure, none of the fifteen had a statewide process for tracking the costs of 
collection.  
In many states, it is difficult to even calculate how much debt individuals with different criminal 
convictions typically face. Fees are often not located in a single place in the statutory code and are not 
collected at a single point in an individual’s criminal proceeding, making it difficult to calculate exactly 
how much debt a criminal conviction might engender. Louisiana, for example, has dozens, if not 
hundreds, of assessments sprawled throughout its code.33   
The amounts imposed in different jurisdictions within a state also often vary dramatically. In Michigan, 
Detroit felony courts regularly provide indigence waivers for non-mandatory fees such as court costs 
and defender costs,34 while in Kent County, judges typically impose $700 in court debt (which helps 
cover the cost of a court-appointed attorney) and will rarely waive this debt for indigence unless the 
individual is sentenced to prison.35  
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Without clear information about the debt burdens that result from different kinds of criminal convictions, 
it is impossible for states to make informed judgments about what fee amounts are appropriate and 
how a new or increased fee will impact total debt burdens. Improved tracking and record-keeping is 
urgently required.
States are similarly derelict in evaluating the impact of collection practices. To the extent that states 
evaluate fee collection processes at all, they seem to look only at one side of the ledger – the money 
brought in – without taking into account the costs of collection incurred by various governmental 
entities, much less the longer term impacts on recidivism and reentry.    
Unlogged direct costs of collection include salary and time for the clerks, probation officers, attorneys, 
and judges who often participate in collection, as well as the costs associated with penalties for non-
payment, which can include sheriff time to execute arrest warrants and nights in local jails.
In this respect, Massachusetts provides a useful example of a thoughtful approach to fees. After facing 
opposition from criminal justice advocates to a proposed local jail fee, in 2010 the legislature instead 
established a commission to investigate the revenue that could be generated from jail fees, the cost of 
administering collection, the impact on the affected population, and other factors.36 Similar studies of 
the real costs and benefits of debt collection in other states could lead to a more considered criminal 
justice debt policy. 
Common Collection Practices . . . And Some Hidden Costs . . .
Probation or parole officers monitor payments. Salary and overtime. Officers distracted from role in 
supporting reentry and rehabilitation.
Debtor must attend regular meetings before 
a judge, clerk, or other collection official.
Salary and overtime. Burdened court dockets.  
Incarceration for failure to pay. Salary and overtime for judges, prosecutors, 
and public defenders. Cost of incarceration. Jail 
overcrowding.  Lost jobs and housing. Difficulty 
paying child support.
Refer debt to private collection agencies. Onerous collection fees, leading to spiraling debt. 
Damaged credit, which hurts housing and employment 
prospects.
Probation terms extended for failure to pay. Probation officer salary and overtime. Increased risk of 
reincarceration for violating probation requirements.
Driver’s license suspended for failure to pay. Challenges in finding and maintaining employment. 
Increased risk of reincarceration for driving with a 
suspended license.
Debt converted to a civil judgment. Damaged credit, which hurts housing and employment 
propsects.
Wage garnishment and tax rebate interception. Individuals discouraged from seeking legitimate 
employment. Financial hardship and inability to meet 
child support commitments.
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Broad reliance on defender fees in the examined states
One common – and particularly troubling – fee category involves fees tied to the use of a public defender. 
Thirteen of the fifteen states studied in this report either authorize or mandate charging indigent individuals 
“defender fees” – sometimes in the thousands of dollars – for exercising their right to counsel.37   
Defender fees can include charges to “apply” for representation before an attorney is appointed, charges 
during the course of a criminal proceeding to offset the costs of representation, and charges at the termination 
of a criminal proceeding to reimburse the state for all or a portion of the costs of representation. In Florida 
and Ohio, individuals are required to pay defender fees even if they are acquitted or have charges dropped.38 
Of the fifteen states, only Pennsylvania and New York do not utilize some form of defender fee.  
Mandatory fees  
Strikingly, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia all utilize mandatory defender fees, providing no opportunity for 
the court to waive the fee if the defendant lacks the financial resources to afford payment.39 In North Carolina, 
the court must order convicted defendants to pay a $50 fee and must direct a judgment to be entered for the 
full value of the defense services provided,40 currently valued at $75/hour for non-capital cases, plus additional 
fees and expenses.41 In Virginia, poor defendants may be charged as much as $1,235 per count for certain 
felonies.42   
Even when defender fee statutes include hardship waivers, some states fail to offer waivers in practice. In Arizona, 
where state law mandates that courts take into account and make factual findings regarding a defendant’s 
financial resources,43 interviews indicate that courts order defendants to reimburse public defense costs in the 
vast majority of cases,44 and that many courts have uniform fee schedules that fail to take into account ability to 
pay.45 
Discouraging the right to counsel
In practice, defender fees often discourage individuals from exercising their constitutional right to an attorney 
– leading to wrongful convictions, over-incarceration, and significant burdens on the operation of courts.  In 
Michigan, for example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association found that the threat of paying 
the full cost of assigned counsel resulted in misdemeanor defendants systematically waiving their right to 
counsel – at a rate of 95 percent in one county, according to a judge’s estimate.46   
The result is that in many states, defender fees effectively circumvent states’ obligation to provide counsel 
to those who cannot afford it, raising serious constitutional questions. The Supreme Court has indicated 
that defender fees should have safeguards to ensure that they do not create a “manifest hardship” for poor 
defendants,47 and numerous state and federal courts have concluded that to be constitutional, defender 
fees must to take into account defendants’ ability to pay and provide for a waiver if payment would impose 
a hardship.48 Similarly, the ABA recommends that “[a]n accused person should not be ordered to pay a 
contribution fee that the person is financially unable to afford,” and that states abolish reimbursement fees 
(imposed at the termination of a proceeding) altogether.49  
In increasingly relying on public defender fees, states ignore their costs – including the harm to individuals and 
to public safety from the conviction of the innocent, the financial burden on taxpayers from over-incarceration, 
and the harm to the integrity of the justice system as a whole when individuals are denied their right to 
counsel.
Fees in Focus: You Have the Right to an Attorney, If You Can Afford It
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Despite the fact that most criminal defendants are indigent, none of the fifteen examined states pay 
adequate attention to whether individuals have the resources to pay criminal justice debt, either when 
courts determine how much debt to impose or during the debt collection process.
In many states, courts are either unwilling or unable to waive fees based on indigence, to tailor payment 
obligations to a person’s ability to pay, or to offer meaningful alternatives to payment such as community 
service. And fourteen of the fifteen examined states utilize at least one form of “poverty penalty,” where 
individuals face additional debt because they are unable to pay off criminal justice debt immediately. The 
result is a system effectively designed to turn individuals with criminal convictions into permanent debtors.
The impact of this debt is significant. As discussed in the next two sections, 
unpaid criminal justice debt puts individuals at risk of imprisonment and 
can impact everything from their employment and housing opportunities, 
to their financial stability, to their right to vote. 
Imposing impossibly high debt burdens on low-income people is 
financially self-defeating for states as well. When debts are imposed 
without taking into account ability to pay, states end up chasing debt 
that is simply uncollectable. According to statewide performance standards for court clerks in Florida, 
for example, only 9 percent of fees assessed in felony cases are expected to be collected.50 Expending 
personnel and resources to collect debt from people who lack the ability to pay is a waste of scarce 
criminal justice funds. And as experts on child support compliance have argued, low-income debtors 
are far more likely to make payments when the payment amount is manageable.51   
A. Lack of Fee Waivers
Even though imposing criminal justice debt on the indigent is costly for states and individuals alike, 
none of the states studied by the Brennan Center have adequate mechanisms to reduce criminal justice 
debt based on a defendant’s ability to pay.  
At least fourteen of the fifteen states – every state but Ohio52 – has at least one mandatory fee that 
courts are required to impose upon certain convicted defendants, regardless of their financial resources.53 
Moreover, even when sentencing courts have the discretion to waive or modify debt levels, in practice, 
many courts routinely fail to consider a defendant’s ability to pay. In Ohio, for example, despite courts’ 
broad authority to waive debt, interviews with clerks and public defenders suggest that courts do not 
routinely waive debts for indigence in practice.54  
It is more common for courts to have the authority to waive or modify criminal justice debt post-
sentencing – at least twelve states allow for post-sentencing waivers or modification of criminal justice 
debt in at least some circumstances.55 But while these post-sentencing options are vital to address 
changed circumstances such as job loss, disability, or changing family commitments, they cannot 
substitute for ability to pay determinations at sentencing. Such determinations are necessary because 
once individuals are sentenced to pay criminal justice debt, they are immediately at risk of sanctions 
for non-payment such as probation revocation and the loss of driving privileges, as well as other harms 
such as damaged credit and a loss of public benefits.  
II.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES FREQUENTLY LEAD TO  
AN INSURMOUNTABLE CYCLE OF DEBT  
The result is a system effectively 
designed to turn individuals 
with criminal convictions into 
permanent debtors.
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Post-sentencing evaluations can also pose logistical challenges. For example, in North Carolina, one 
public defender observed that while individuals have the right to seek a post-sentencing reduction in 
their payment obligations by petitioning the court, they rarely do so because they do not have a right to 
counsel to aid with the petition. Instead, individuals often fall behind on payments and face probation 
revocation before a court has the opportunity to consider whether their fees should be reduced or 
waived.56 This wastes resources and can potentially lead to unwarranted arrests and jail stays as part of 
the probation revocation process.  
Finally, in many states, courts do not take advantage of their authority to waive or modify debt post-
sentencing. For example, in Virginia, a court may reduce a defendant’s financial obligations (including 
fines, costs, and restitution) if a defendant establishes, at a show cause proceeding for failure to pay, that 
the failure to pay was not the defendant’s fault.57 However, according to court clerks interviewed for 
this report, courts very rarely reduce the amount of a fee or fine and almost never reduce the amount 
of restitution owed.58
B.  Unworkable Payment Plans
Most states also fail to provide adequate payment plan 
options. While payment plans cannot undo the harm 
from unreasonably high debt burdens, a well-designed 
plan can make it easier for low-income people to pay 
down medium-size debts that might otherwise push 
them toward default. Yet despite their obvious utility, 
payment plan options in most states are burdensome 
and inflexible.   
All fifteen of the states studied in this report permit 
payment plans in at least some contexts.60 But in 
many states, payment plan systems need to be made 
more effective and fair.  
In many states, payment plans are not geared to 
individuals’ actual ability to pay. For example, the 
Michigan State Court Administrative Office has a 
collection policy that requires individuals to make 
an initial payment of $45 if they are approved for a 
payment plan, regardless of their income.61 Similarly, 
in Louisa Circuit Court in Virginia, individuals must 
pay a minimum of $50 per month and an initial 
payment of $100. Another Virginia jurisdiction, 
Roanoke Circuit Court, usually requires payments to be large enough to pay off the entire debt within 
one year, regardless of its size.62  
Rather than setting a fixed plan, a better practice would be for courts to impose payment plans based on 
the individual needs of defendants. For example, Florida law presumes that an individual is able to pay 
a monthly payment equaling one-twelfth of two percent of his or her annual net income, and provides 
that the court may review the reasonableness of a payment plan employing this presumption.63 Yet even 
in Florida, this presumption is often ignored and payment levels are set at fixed amounts.64  
Most states do not have clearly defined standards for 
determining how much criminal justice debt an individual 
has the ability to pay. As result, even when states provide 
for hardship waivers, they are often ignored or inconsistently 
applied. Best practices developed by the Brennan Center 
for indigent defense appointments provide guidance for 
establishing criminal justice debt standards:59 
•   State should have uniform, written requirements for what 
debt levels are appropriate given individuals’ resources.
•   Screening should evaluate genuine financial ability, taking 
into account other obligations should as child support 
commitments. In determining ability to pay, screeners 
should not include income needed for living expenses, 
non-liquid assets, and family and friends’ assets.
•   Individuals who receive public benefits, reside in 
correctional or mental health facilities, or have incomes 
below a fixed multiple of the federal poverty guidelines 
should be presumed ineligible to pay and should receive 
automatic waivers.
The Need for Clear Standards
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In another disturbing practice, jurisdictions in at least nine states charge individuals extra fees for 
entering into a payment plan.65 This can discourage people from entering payment plans in the first 
place, and turn payment plans into a vehicle for increasing, rather than diminishing, debt burdens. For 
instance, Orleans district in Louisiana imposes a $100 payment plan fee, and Franklin County in Ohio 
imposes a $25 fee.66 These fees target individuals with the least capacity to take on additional financial 
obligations, and contribute to and perpetuate cycles of debt.   
C.  No Meaningful Community Service Alternatives  
Another potential path out of criminal justice debt is meaningful community service options for the 
indigent. Well-designed community service programs can help individuals with criminal convictions 
develop job skills and avoid long-term debts that keep them entangled with the justice system.      
In twelve of the fifteen states the Brennan Center studied, interviewees reported that their state 
offered at least limited community service options in lieu of criminal justice debt. But practices varied 
significantly, both within individual states and across the country, such that many individuals lack 
meaningful community service options in practice.
In some states, community service options are rarely applied at all. For example, in Florida, judges are 
permitted to convert statutory financial obligations into court-imposed community service for those 
who cannot pay, but it appears that courts seldom take advantage of this option.  According to court 
clerks, only 16 of 67 Florida counties converted any mandatory criminal debt imposed in felony cases 
to community service. Of those 16 that did report using community service, ten converted less than 
$3,000 of debt to community service in one year.67  
In other states, community service is only offered for certain categories of financial obligations, which can 
leave individuals still liable for significant dollar amounts. For example, in Georgia, community service 
is generally only an option to offset certain financial obligations, such as fines.68 And some states offer no 
community service options at all. For instance, North Carolina law does not offer individuals the option 
of performing community service in lieu of paying criminal justice debt.69 In fact, when individuals are 
ordered to undertake community service as a term of their sentence, they must pay a $200 fee to offset the 
cost of the program.70
The design of community service programs also matters. For example, defenders in Illinois observed 
that when community service is imposed on individuals who are otherwise employed, it can be difficult 
for them to complete the necessary hours.71 For this reason, community service should only be imposed 
at the defendant’s request, or when an unemployed defendant has been unable to make payments. 
Similarly, judges should have discretion as to how many hours of community service should be required 
to pay off criminal justice debt, rather than mandating by statute a fixed dollar value per hour.  If a person 
faces thousands of dollars of debt, a fixed dollar equivalent of service hours may not be realistic.
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In the middle of 2006, Michelle was sentenced, on fraud and drug charges, to six months in jail 
and three years on probation. She was also required to pay approximately $40,000 in restitution, 
an obligation she embraces as necessary to compensate her victims for her wrongdoing. But while 
Michelle works to pay off her obligations, her debt grows by the month.  
After serving her six months in jail Michelle began a three-year probation term. Back in her community, 
Michelle was fortunate to get a steady job, and she started making payments on the restitution she 
owed. The court put her on a payment plan under which she owed $230 per month. But, as she paid 
off her restitution, she also accrued probation fees of $136.78 per month, which continued to add 
to her total debt. Michelle was later downgraded to “administrative” probation, but continued to be 
charged a (lower) monthly fee.
Michelle worked hard to pay each month, at times paying down more than required. Even when 
she got laid off and was unemployed for over a year, Michelle paid what she could while supporting 
a daughter, but she feared punishment for her accumulating debt. “When I got laid off, there was 
one month – it was Christmas and my daughter’s sixteenth birthday – when I couldn’t make any 
payment,” says Michelle. “But the financial officer told me that if I didn’t make next month’s payment 
they’d give me a probation violation and send me back to jail. That’s the part that scared me most – 
I’d get my electric turned off before I missed a payment and had to maybe go back to jail.”
She worries, “for the unpaid probation fees, they can put me in jail if I don’t make payments . . . . 
Anytime that you owe probation and you don’t pay, they give you thirty days and then they issue a 
bench warrant for your arrest.”
When her three years of sentenced probation time came to an end, Michelle learned that because 
she had not yet repaid her restitution in full, she would remain on administrative probation until April 
of 2011, the maximum time allowed under the law. As a result, she continues to be charged $33 per 
month in new fees.   
As of June 2010, Michelle had paid $6,212 toward her total debt, but she still has a long way to go. 
With her current job, Michelle earns about $1,400 a month, with no government benefits. Her debt 
from monthly fees alone now totals over $2,000, with months still to go on her probation term. 
Of these other fees that have accumulated while she pays off her restitution, she says, “I’ve 
only ever been arrested that one time. I made a mistake. I messed up. And now all of this is still 
happening. I can’t imagine what it would be like for people who can’t get a job or don’t have the 
support I have.” 
California Woman Faces Spiraling Debt72
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In contrast, when community service programs are well-
designed, the benefits can be significant. Cambria County, 
Pennsylvania, for example, offers individuals who owe fines 
and court costs the opportunity to participate in a work 
detail if they are unable to make their monthly payments. A 
person may work at a preauthorized site such as the Salvation 
Army or YMCA, or may seek approval from the work crew 
supervisor to volunteer at another site, such as a local church 
or daycare center. A similar program is available for individuals 
incarcerated in the County Prison, where selected inmates are 
typically given the opportunity to work on county property, 
such as at the courthouse. By participating in this program 
until they are released from prison or gainfully employed, 
participants can avoid financial hardship arising from debt. 
According to one public defender, “the work program offers 
the person a chance to prove to themselves, family and the 
court that they are serious about reintegrating themselves as a 
productive, responsible member of the community, building 
self-esteem and dignity along the way . . . and of course the 
ultimate goal, reducing recidivism.”88
D.   Poverty Penalties Compound Debt and Enrich 
Private Companies  
In addition to failing to offer adequate waivers for the 
indigent and meaningful payment plan and community 
service options, the Brennan Center found that many states 
also charge additional fees when individuals fail to pay off 
their debts immediately – without looking at whether the 
debtor has the resources to pay. These charges effectively penalize people solely for being poor.  
Fourteen of the fifteen states studied have statutes authorizing some form of poverty penalty or have 
at least one jurisdiction that utilizes such a penalty – including late fees, interest charges, payment plan 
fees, and collection fees.  
•	 	In	thirteen states, individuals can be charged interest or late fees if they fall behind on payments89 
– even if they lack any resources to make the payments or have conflicting obligations such as 
child support. The added debt can be significant – such as a flat charge of $300 in California,90 
late charges of $1091 or $2092 every time a defendant makes a late payment in some Florida 
counties, and a 20 percent late fee after 56 days in Michigan.93  
•	 	Nine of the states studied authorize exorbitant “collection fees,” frequently payable to private debt 
collection firms.94 For example, in Alabama, individuals must pay a collection fee of 30 percent of 
the amount due if their payments are 90 days overdue.95 Similarly, Florida law authorizes private 
collection agencies to charge individuals up to a 40 percent surcharge on amounts collected,96 
and Illinois law authorizes charging individuals who fall behind on payments with a fee of 30 
percent of the delinquent amount.97 Only one of the states studied, Texas, exempts defendants 
who are unable to pay their underlying debt from an added collection fee.98
States With At Least Limited  
Community Service Options Available
Yes No
Alabama73 
Arizona74 
California75 
Florida76 
Georgia77 
Illinois78 
Louisiana79 
Michigan80 
Missouri81 
New York82 
North Carolina83 
Ohio84 
Pennsylvania85 
Texas86 
Virginia87 
NB: This list includes those states for which the Brennan 
Center identified an authorizing statute and/or practice of 
providing community service as an option to pay off at least 
some forms of criminal justice debt.
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•	 	Nine states charge defendants a fee for entering into a payment plan – also without any 
exemption for poverty.99 Fee amounts vary, from $10 in Virginia,100 to $100 in New Orleans.101 
Florida debtors can be charged $25 to enroll in a payment plan, or an additional $5 charge per 
month.102 
By pushing poor people further into debt, poverty penalties make it harder for them to meet their daily 
needs and to fulfill important commitments such as child support. For example, California’s $300 
civil assessment for defendants who fall behind in paying a fine or related surcharge103 is close to the 
average monthly food budget for a household making less than $70,000 per year.104 Collection fees 
in Florida – which can reach 40 percent of the amount collected – likewise regularly add hundreds 
of dollars to individuals’ debt burdens and can bring their total debt into four figures.105 Often these 
charges far exceed ordinary standards of fairness. For example, Alabama’s 30 percent “collection fee”106 
is in striking contrast to its general usury law, which limits interest rates on private loans to a maximum 
of 8 percent.107  
Certainly, states have a legitimate interest in creating incentives so that defendants that can pay their 
debts do pay them. But states need to ensure that they do not end up penalizing the truly poor and 
enriching private debt collectors at their expense.  
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Criminal justice debt puts many individuals on the fast track to re-arrest and re-incarceration. At their 
worst, criminal justice debt collection efforts result in a new form of debtors’ prison for the poor.   
In a startling number of jurisdictions, we found that individuals can face arrest and incarceration not 
for any criminal activity, but rather for simply falling behind on debt payments. Our research also 
uncovered a variety of ways in which criminal justice debt 
can be the first step toward new offenses and more jail time 
– all originating from the failure to pay off debt.
Some of these practices violate the Constitution or state law. 
All of them undercut former offenders’ efforts to reintegrate 
into their communities. Even a short stint in jail can lead to 
harmful consequences such as job loss, family disruptions, 
and interruptions in treatment for addiction, all of which 
create a situation ripe for new and more serious offenses. 
And the costs of arrest and incarceration – passed on to the 
taxpayer – are often more than the state can ever hope to 
collect from debtors.  
Yet despite these legal objections and hidden costs, versions of debtors’ prison persist in all of the states 
examined by the Brennan Center.
A. History and Constitutional Limitations  
Historically, being in debt was often tantamount to hopelessness. In ancient Rome, a debtor who could 
not repay an outstanding loan was bound in chains in a public plaza for three days, after which he was 
sold as a slave or executed.109 In England, debtors’ prisons were widely used into the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries.110 
Early America also relied on debtors’ prisons. In the 1830s, some U.S. states imprisoned three to five 
times as many individuals for debt as for actual crimes.111 By this time popular opposition to debtors’ 
prison had begun to grow, however, and in 1833, the United States eliminated the imprisonment of 
debtors under federal law, with many states following suit as well.112  
But these provisions did not stop the use of debtors’ prison to collect criminal justice debt imposed by 
courts. In fact, beginning soon after the Civil War and continuing through the 1930s, many Southern 
states used criminal justice debt collection as a means of effectively re-enslaving African-Americans, 
allowing landowners and companies to “lease” black convicts by paying off criminal justice debt that 
they were too poor to pay on their own.113
More recently, the Supreme Court has made clear that debtors’ prison can be used to collect criminal 
justice debt only when a person has the ability to make payments but refuses to do so. In 1970, the 
Court ruled in Williams v. Illinois that extending a maximum prison term because a person is too poor 
to pay fines or court costs violates the right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.114 
And in 1983, it ruled in Bearden v. Georgia that the Fourteenth Amendment bars courts from revoking 
probation for a failure to pay a fine without first inquiring into a person’s ability to pay and considering 
whether there are adequate alternatives to imprisonment.115
III.  HARSH COLLECTION PRACTICES FORGE FOUR PATHS TO DEBTORS’ PRISON 
“[I]f the probationer has made all reasonable efforts 
to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot do 
so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally 
unfair to revoke probation automatically without 
considering whether adequate alternative methods 
of punishing the defendant are available.”
Bearden v. Georgia108
The Supreme Court Rejects Debtors’ Prison
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Yet despite these constitutional protections, Brennan Center interviews with defenders and court 
personnel revealed that some jurisdictions ignore the requirement that courts inquire into ability to 
pay before utilizing debtors’ prison, while many others skirt the edges of the law by failing to evaluate 
a defendant’s ability to pay until after he or she has been arrested, or even jailed, for criminal justice 
debt, or by allowing defendants to “volunteer” to be incarcerated. Only recently, an appellate court in 
Louisiana found that a trial court in Monroe Parish violated the Constitution in sentencing an indigent 
person to an automatic jail term that was triggered if he failed to pay fines and costs.116  
Even more jurisdictions arrest and incarcerate individuals who miss court dates or other appointments 
related to criminal justice debt – even when they lack the resources to make payments – making 
criminal justice debt a path to new offenses. And other common collection practices, such as extending 
probation or suspending driver’s licenses, also lead to new offenses rooted in debt.
B. Four Paths to Debtors’ Prison  
Individuals with heavy debt burdens risk incarceration in all fifteen of the states examined in this report 
– in many cases without regard for their ability to pay. The Brennan Center identified four main paths 
to this disturbing new form of debtors’ prison.
 
•	 Path 1:  Probation or parole revoked or not granted
  All fifteen states make criminal justice debt a condition of probation, parole, or other correc-
tional supervision. In some states, when individuals fail to pay, they may face re-arrest and may 
ultimately be sent to prison. In Pennsylvania, persons in prison are ineligible for parole unless 
they pay a $60 fee that makes no exception for the indigent.
•	 Path 2:   Incarceration through civil or criminal enforcement proceedings
  At least eleven states have statutes or practices that authorize incarceration as a penalty for a 
willful failure to pay criminal justice debt, often under the guise of civil contempt.
•	 Path 3:  “Choosing” jail
  Interviewees in two states reported programs where defendents can request to spend time in 
jail as a way of paying down court-imposed debt. These programs are often voluntary in name 
only and reflect the untenable choices that poor defendants must make.
•	 Path 4:  Arrest and pre-hearing incarceration
  All fifteen states have jurisdictions that arrest people for failing to pay criminal justice debt or 
appear at debt-related hearings, leading in many cases to multi-day jail terms pending an abil-
ity to pay hearing.
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1. Probation or Parole Revoked or Not Granted 
All fifteen states studied in this report make at least some forms of criminal justice debt a condition of 
probation or parole, including for the indigent, putting individuals at risk of incarceration if a court 
finds that missed payments were willful.118  
In several states, supervision authorities regularly seek revocation based on missed payments, requiring 
individuals to appear at hearings to explain failures to pay.119 While in many states these hearings do not 
lead to a decision to send the person back to prison, incarceration is a common result in jurisdictions in 
at least two states, Alabama and Missouri.120 Many other states have jurisdictions that sometimes revoke 
probation or parole for failures to pay.121 Failure to pay can also lead to revocation if an individual cannot 
pay for mandatory treatments, classes, or polygraph tests that are often conditions of supervision.122
Under the Constitution, while a court can make debt payment a condition of probation or parole 
regardless of ability to pay, probation and parole can only be revoked after a court makes an ability to 
pay inquiry. Troublingly, defenders in at least five of the surveyed states reported instances where they 
believed courts had either failed to consider ability to pay altogether or used an unreasonable standard 
for determining ability to pay in the process of revoking probation or parole.123 
For example, a public defender in Illinois observed that rather than evaluating a person’s assets and 
obligations, one judge simply asked everyone if they smoked. If they smoked and had paid nothing 
since the last court date, he found willful nonpayment and put them in jail without doing any further 
inquiry.124 Similarly, in Michigan, a public defender said that while incarceration for failure to pay is not 
•	 	Probation	typically refers to a court-imposed sentence that releases a person into the 
community, usually subject to the person meeting stated conditions, rather than sending the 
person to jail or prison. 
•	 	Parole	typically refers to the release of a person from prison before he or she has completed a 
full sentence, and is usually granted for good behavior and subject to the parolee meeting certain 
conditions during the parole period. This report refers to probation and parole together  
as supervision.
•	 	Conditions of supervision are requirements that a probationer or parolee must abide by under 
order of the court or parole board. Examples of conditions of supervision include attending drug 
treatment programs, abiding by curfews, meeting with probation or parole officers, and paying 
criminal justice debt.
•  If a person under supervision fails to meet required conditions, they have violated that condition.  
Allegations of violations are typically brought before a judge or the parole board. If the judge or 
parole board finds that a condition has been violated, they have the option to revoke probation 
or parole, sending the person back to prison.
Key Terms117
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“I do, generally, believe that very few of 
our judges have ever experienced the kind 
of poverty a majority of my clients live 
with, so they are often unrealistic about 
what is possible.”
— Public defender in 
Jackson County, Illinois128
common, she has observed judges make only cursory ability to pay inquiries, such as finding a person’s 
failure to pay willful because he had cable television.125 In some jurisdictions missed payments are also 
regularly listed in supervision reports as one of many reasons for revocation,126 placing the defendant in 
a negative light even if the court formally revokes supervision on another ground.
A similar path to debtors’ prison occurs when states condition 
eligibility for probation and parole on the payment of criminal 
justice debt, denying probation or parole and holding 
individuals in prison until they pay their debts. Pennsylvania 
utilizes such a practice, making eligibility for probation, 
parole, and accelerated rehabilitative disposition contingent 
on paying a $60 court costs fee. Strikingly, this law has no 
waiver for indigence, in blatant violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.127  
According to the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, many 
inmates who were otherwise eligible for release on parole have 
been kept in prison – sometimes for a period of months – 
because they lacked the resources to pay $60.129 Ironically, it costs almost $100 to hold a person in 
prison for a single day in Pennsylvania.130  
2. Incarceration Through Civil or Criminal Enforcement Proceedings 
Another common path to debtors’ prison takes place when civil or criminal enforcement proceedings 
are used to incarcerate individuals who fail to make debt payments. At least eleven of the fifteen states 
examined in this report have statutes or practices that authorize incarceration for willful failures to pay 
criminal justice debt, often under the guise of civil contempt.131   
These proceedings raise particular concern in states where individuals have no right to counsel in civil 
proceedings even when they face incarceration. For example, many Florida counties use “collections 
courts,” where individuals are at risk of being jailed for civil contempt but have no right to a public 
defender.132 This lack of counsel is particularly disturbing when, as in Florida, defendants are hauled 
into court for debt that no judge has ever determined they have the ability to pay. While most states 
recognize a right to counsel in civil proceedings that could result in incarceration, high courts in 
Florida,133 Georgia,134 and Ohio,135 have rejected this notion (although lower courts in Ohio are divided 
as to whether the high court’s ruling continues to be good law).136  
Denying individuals counsel at proceedings where their liberty is at stake raises serious constitutional 
questions137 – and creates a significant risk that individuals will end up incarcerated simply for being 
poor. Attorneys play a crucial role in ability to pay proceedings: they can collect and present evidence 
regarding ability to pay criminal justice debt, navigate often-confusing rules for altering payment 
commitments or debt loads, and ensure that individuals’ rights are protected and that they understand 
the implications of any payment commitments that they make. Putting individuals’ liberty at risk 
without access to an attorney draws the fairness and accuracy of civil contempt proceedings into serious 
question.
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3. “Choosing” Jail
Some states also create a third path to debtors’ prison by offering individuals the “choice” of spending 
time in jail as a way of paying off criminal justice debt, highlighting just how severe a burden criminal 
debt imposes on the poor.  
In California138 and Missouri,139 for example, some jurisdictions allow people to “volunteer” to sit in jail 
as a way of fulfilling debt obligations.  In many cases, volunteering for jail is a choice in name only. 
According to a public defender in Missouri, for example, one judge treats nonpayment as an implicit 
request to commute fines to jail time, eliminating any pretext that jail time was the defendant’s 
voluntary choice.  The defender successfully fought this policy, but the judge reportedly still applies it 
to individuals not represented by a public defender.140 The Supreme Court rejected exactly this kind of 
practice in Tate v. Short, holding that courts could not automatically convert an indigent defendant’s 
unpaid fines into a jail sentence.141 In Marin County, California, one public defender observed that 
judges only very rarely waive criminal justice debt for indigence, and that clients who are poor and 
unable to work are more likely to convert debt to jail terms, to avoid facing future probation violations 
for failures to pay.142
Individuals who “choose” jail terms to pay down debts may also accumulate new debts in the process. 
For example, in at least one Missouri jurisdiction, debtors who choose to sit in jail to pay down one set 
of fines and costs reportedly accrue new jail board bills for their stay in jail.143 
In other states, although there is no explicit statutory provision for choosing to “sit out” fees and fines, 
defendants can still effectively choose incarceration by accepting plea agreements that provide for jail 
time in lieu of certain forms of debt. For example, in one North Carolina county, individuals who are 
unable to immediately pay criminal justice debt are placed on supervised probation and are typically 
sentenced to the full length of their suspended sentence if they are found to have willfully violated 
probation. With such high-stake debt burdens at issue, one public defender said that if she expects a 
client will have trouble making payments she will often encourage the client to accept a plea agreement 
that provides for jail time in lieu of certain financial obligations.144 Ironically, states not only forego debt 
revenue in these cases but also typically face additional costs from unnecessary incarceration.  
4. Arrest and Pre-Hearing Incarceration 
Finally, in all fifteen states, at least one jurisdiction has a practice of arresting individuals if they miss 
debt payments or fail to appear at a debt-related proceeding, typically as the first step in a probation or 
parole revocation hearing or a civil contempt proceeding.145 In some jurisdictions, a missed payment 
automatically triggers an arrest warrant,146 while in others, clerks or probations officers regularly seek 
arrest warrants when individuals fall behind on payments.147 And in still others, arrests occur for 
“failure to appear” at a debt-related hearing, meeting, or court date.148 Arrests lead not only to an 
initial loss of freedom but in many cases to days in jail prior to a court appearance and an ability to pay 
determination.
The use of arrests as a collection mechanism raises serious concerns because in many jurisdictions, arrests 
and pre-hearing incarceration take place before a court has ever assessed whether the individual has the 
resources to make payments. In Florida, for example, some counties use “pay or appear” hearings, 
where an individual is required to either make a payment by a fixed deadline or appear in court for 
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a hearing. If a person fails to pay and does not appear in court, the person is arrested and held in jail 
pending a court hearing unless he or she can pay a “purge.” In most cases, no court has ever determined 
that person had the ability to make payments in the first place.149
And as in Florida, even when jurisdictions do provide options for individuals to make a payment in 
order to be released from jail prior to an ability-to-pay hearing, the amounts themselves are not typically 
tied to ability to pay.150 As a result, poor people must frequently stay in jail pending an ability-to-pay 
hearing, sometimes for several days.
Troublingly, even when an arrest is based on a failure to appear, rather than a failure to pay, in many 
instances indigence is the underlying cause of the failure to appear. In Texas and Michigan, for example, 
defenders complain that in some jurisdictions, aggressive collection tactics by probation officers deter 
poor people from showing up to probation meetings if they lack the resources to make a required 
payment – leading these same probation officers to issue a probation violation for the failure to 
appear.151  
The result – sending debtors to overcrowded prisons and jails for failing to follow a court order – is costly 
to states, harmful to public safety, and unfairly burdensome to debtors whose failure to appear is often 
rooted in poverty. In New Orleans, for example, a review of a week of felony docket sheets revealed that 
a full 6.15 percent of cases before the court related to debt collection issues, a questionable allocation of 
resources in a crime-plagued city. Of these, approximately 21.6 percent were cases where an arrest warrant 
had issued because of a missed payment or failure to appear.152
  
While the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the constitutionality of using arrests for 
failures to pay debt or appear at debt-related hearings, at core these practices punish debtors without 
first determining whether they have the ability to pay. This 
is inconsistent with basic fairness and runs directly against the 
equal protection and due process principles reflected in the cases 
prohibiting debtors’ prison.
 
C.  Aggressive Collection Tactics Push Debtors Toward 
New Offenses
In addition to creating new paths to debtors’ prison, many states’ 
collection practices push debtors toward the old path to prison: 
reoffending. Harsh collection practices can lead to probation and 
parole violations and new offenses that are rooted in debt, often 
leading to new prison terms and undermining efforts at reentry.  
1. Suspension of Driver’s Licenses
One common collection practice that leads to a cycle of 
reincarceration is the suspension of driver’s licenses. At least eight 
states suspend driver’s licenses based on missed payments, in many 
cases without considering whether a person had the resources to 
make payments in the first place. In still other states, individuals can have their licenses revoked for a 
failure to appear at a hearing or for an arrest warrant, the underlying cause of which is often criminal 
justice debt.161 If these individuals continue driving – as they often must to work – they face new and 
often severe criminal penalties for driving with a suspended license.
California153 
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NB: This list includes those states for which the 
Brennan Center identified an authorizing statute 
and/or practice of altering driving privileges for a 
failure to pay at least some forms of criminal debt.
States That Suspend Driver’s Licenses  
To Punish Missed Payments
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In California, for example, driving with a suspended or revoked license carries a penalty of up to six 
months imprisonment and/or a fine of between $300 and $1000 for a first offense.162 If a person is 
convicted more than once in a twelve month period, he or she is considered a habitual traffic offender 
and faces mandatory incarceration.163 As a result, even if the debtor’s original crime was quite minor, 
driver’s license suspension can push debtors toward more serious offenses and future incarceration.
2. Extending Probation Terms 
In addition to ordering criminal justice debt as a condition of probation, at least thirteen states also 
have a statute or practice allowing courts to extend probation terms for failure to pay debt in at least 
some cases.  In many of these states, jurisdictions extend probation even if the person has satisfied all 
other probation conditions, and even if it is undisputed that the person lacks the resources to pay.
As a result, individuals stay enmeshed in the criminal justice system 
for longer and face a risk of incarceration for longer – not for new 
crimes, but for technical violations of probation conditions, including 
payment conditions.  
In San Francisco, for example, individuals with extended probation 
terms must continue reporting regularly to probation officers, attend 
counseling sessions, and fulfill other probation conditions. These 
requirements are often time-consuming and can interfere, among 
other things, with efforts to find and maintain steady employment. 
Missing a meeting or other condition of probation can lead to a 
probation violation charge – and possibly arrest, a jail stay pending 
a judicial hearing, and ultimately the revocation of probation and a 
new prison term.164  
In this way, extending probation for a failure to pay off criminal justice 
debt makes future interaction with the criminal justice system more 
likely, and creates a host of burdens unrelated to the debt payments 
themselves.  
D. Debtors’ Prison Wastes Public Funds
The underlying motivation for using debtors’ prison and other 
aggressive collection practices is generally fiscal: states look to criminal 
justice debt as a way to boost revenue. But strikingly, debtors’ prison and other collection practices 
that lead individuals on a path to reincarceration simply do not add up – they are expensive and place 
additional pressure on already-overcrowded prisons and jails. As policies for increasing revenue, they 
are penny-wise and pound-foolish.  
Any time an individual is arrested or imprisoned, taxpayers face a hefty bill.  California, for example, 
spends more than $130 per day to incarcerate a single prisoner.178 And over-incarceration requires states 
to divert resources from other critical areas, including everything from education to law enforcement. 
Indeed, with the recent economic crisis putting unprecedented strain on state budgets, many states 
have been rethinking their high rates of incarceration. Most notably, California recently announced a 
plan to reduce the number of inmates in the state’s 33 prisons next year by 6,500.179
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Yet in the quest for criminal justice fee revenue, states are sending more people into prisons and jails. 
While states focus on the income such collection practices bring in, they generally fail to look at the 
other side of the balance sheet, including costs imposed on sheriffs’ offices, local jails and prisons, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and the courts themselves.  
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina faced an $85 million budget gap this year, with austerity measures 
including everything from closing 12 library branches to a potential $9 million dollar cut to the Sheriff’s 
Office.180 Yet records from the Mecklenburg County Fine Collection Department indicate that some of 
the county’s debt collection efforts cost more money than they bring in.
According to an official in the Fine Collection Department, when individuals on a payment plan fail to 
make scheduled payments, they receive a series of postcards and calls and ultimately a probation 
violation report, requiring them to appear in court.  If these posrcards and reports go unserved because 
a person’s address has changed, a warrant is then issued for the person’s arrest.181  
Department records indicate that in 2009, 564 individuals were arrested because they fell behind on 
debt and failed to provide the Fine Collection Department with updated address information.182 In order 
to be eligible for release from jail prior to a hearing before the court, they were required to pay the full 
amount of their debt. Of the 564 individuals arrested, 246 people did not pay and were held in jail for 
an average of about 4 days pending a compliance hearing – at which point their debts were often 
cancelled.183 This jail term alone cost more than $40,000184 – while the county collected only $33,476 
from the individuals who had been arrested.185 Additional arrests also took place when individuals did 
not appear at debt-related hearings, costing the county even more money.186
North Carolina County’s Collection Practices Do Not Add Up
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The harm from criminal justice debt does not stop at debtors’ prison and new debt-related offenses. In 
all of the fifteen states studied, criminal justice debt and related collection tactics pose severe hurdles in 
virtually every area of life.  
From seeking and maintaining employment and housing, to obtaining public benefits, to meeting 
financial obligations such as child support, to exercising the right to vote, criminal justice debt is a 
barrier to individuals seeking to rebuild their lives after a criminal conviction. In the rush to raise 
revenue, states have not considered whether turning defendants into debtors is consistent with the need 
to reduce recidivism, reduce over-incarceration, and promote reentry.
A. Hurdles to Finding Housing and Employment
One significant result of the heavy debt burdens and aggressive collection tactics documented in the 
fifteen states is that debtors face major hurdles to finding and maintaining housing and employment, 
both key steps in promoting former offenders’ reentry into their communities. 
For instance, in many states, criminal justice debt wreaks havoc on individuals’ credit scores, and with it, 
their housing and employment prospects. At least eleven states allow at least some forms of criminal justice 
debt to be converted into civil judgments or collected in the same manner as civil judgments,187 meaning that 
the debt is filed with the county clerk just like any other judgment and becomes public information available 
for credit reporting agencies.188 And at least four states affirmatively report delinquent defendants to credit 
agencies in some contexts, typically via private vendors contracted to help collect delinquent debt.189 
The resulting damaged credit scores hurt individuals applying for a loan or mortgage,190 as well as those 
seeking public or rental housing where credit scores are often a screening mechanism. For example, in 
New Haven, Connecticut, the city’s Housing Authority recently approved a program that would allow 
preferential placement for up to 12 ex-offenders on lists for public housing. However, the new program 
does not make exceptions for individuals with a poor credit history.191 
Reporting criminal justice debt to credit agencies also impacts employment prospects. Background 
checks by employers increasingly include credit reports,192 which can be used as a form of “character 
screening” for job applicants.193 By damaging credit, criminal justice debt functions as yet another 
application hurdle for jobseekers.  
Even more troubling, credit reports can also serve as a back-door way for employers to identify individuals 
with criminal records. In order to promote reentry, some states limit how and when employers can use 
a defendant’s criminal history in hiring decisions.194 Criminal justice debt appearing on a credit report 
can potentially inform employers that an individual has a criminal history even when the legislature has 
decided that this information should not be made available to employers.  
In addition to damaging credit, criminal justice debt and related collection practices harm employment 
and housing prospects in other ways as well. Wage and tax garnishment, for example, discourages 
individuals from participating in legitimate employment and pushes them toward the underground 
economy.195 All fifteen states studied permit the use of at least certain civil collection methods for 
criminal justice debt collection, such as liens or the garnishment of bank accounts or wages,196 and nine 
of the fifteen states utilize tax rebate interceptions for at least limited purposes.197  
IV.  CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT IMPEDES REENTRY AND REHABILITATION  
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Likewise, states’ use of arrests and incarceration as collection tactics can disrupt work schedules and create 
an erroneous impression that the person has committed a new crime, making it harder to hold down 
housing or a job. Longer-term periods of incarceration for failing to pay criminal justice debt cause even 
greater disruptions.  Similarly, suspending driver’s licenses for a failure to pay criminal justice debt can 
make it difficult for many people to search for and hold down jobs.198 Strikingly, both Florida and Virginia 
routinely revoke driver’s licenses for missed debt payments without first considering a person’s ability to 
pay.199 This practice is in marked contrast to the child support context, where driving penalties for non-
payment are typically viewed as a last resort, leaving officials with substantial discretion.200
B.	 Public	Benefits	at	Risk
In a harsh irony, aggressive collection practices can also render 
individuals with criminal justice debt ineligible for public benefits, 
simply for being too poor to make debt payments. 
As discussed in the context of debtors’ prison, all fifteen of the 
examined states make criminal justice debt a condition or probation 
or parole.201 But treating a failure to pay criminal justice debt as a violation of a probation or parole term can 
impact debtors in other ways as well – under federal law, individuals who violate a term of their probation 
or parole are ineligible for federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) funds,202 as well as Food 
Stamps,203 low-income housing and housing assistance,204 and Supplemental Security Income for the elderly 
and disabled.205 By aggressively using the probation and parole supervision process for debt collection, states 
increase economic insecurity for a population that is already overwhelmingly poor – a practice directly at 
odds with the goal of promoting reentry.   
The risk of losing public benefits is particularly serious because in practice, agencies sometimes terminate 
benefits solely on the basis of a warrant alleging that a person has violated probation or parole by failing 
to make payments – even when a court has not made a finding that the person had the ability to pay, 
and even when there may have been a mistake about the person’s parole or probation status.  
A recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals case, Clark v. Astrue,206 addressed this issue in the context 
of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Old-Age, Survivor and Disability Insurance (OASDI). As 
documented in an amicus brief by the Empire Justice Center and other non-profits, individuals around the 
country have lost SSI and OASDI benefits based on warrants arising from criminal justice debt that they 
cannot afford to pay.207 The Second Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs that the government had no right to 
terminate these benefits unless it was “more likely than not” that the person actually violated a condition 
of probation or parole.208 However, because the Social Security Administration has not yet acquiesced to 
this decision, it is likely that criminal justice debt warrants will still be used to terminate benefits, even 
when a court has never determined whether the person has the ability to make payments.209  
C. Barriers to Paying Child Support 
The heavy debt burdens documented in the fifteen states also harm family relationships. In Texas, for 
example, 10 to 20 percent of felony probationers and 15 to 25 percent of parolees owe child support.210 
Rather than encouraging former offenders to meet these obligations, however, many states impose 
criminal justice debt obligations directly in tension with child support commitments.  
By aggressively using the probation 
and parole supervision process for debt 
collection, states increase economic 
insecurity for a population that is 
already overwhelmingly poor . . .
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Although federal law prioritizes child support obligations over all other debts owed to the state, 
including criminal justice debt,211 obligations to make monthly criminal justice debt payment can 
often be in direct conflict with child support commitments – particularly when judges lack discretion 
to take into account ability to pay in setting debt levels or creating payment plans. Moreover, when 
aggressive collection tactics result in the loss of jobs, housing, or public benefits, it is often impossible 
for individuals to meet their child care and child support obligations.  
In Texas, one fee statute explicitly takes into account child support commitments, requiring the court to 
consider “the defendant’s employment status, earning ability, and financial resources” and “any other special 
circumstances that may affect the defendant’s ability to pay, including child support obligations and including any 
financial responsibilities owed by the defendant to dependents or restitution payments owed by the defendant 
to a victim.”212 This provision should be a model for other Texas fee statutes – and other states should follow its 
lead
D. Debt Functions as a Poll Tax
In addition to impacting financial security, criminal justice debt also harms individuals’ most 
fundamental rights. All fifteen of the states examined in this report disenfranchise people with criminal 
convictions for some period of time.213 In at least seven of these fifteen states, individuals must pay 
off criminal justice debt before they can regain their eligibility to vote after a conviction. This modern-
day poll tax is particularly harmful to the African-American community – nationwide, 13 percent of 
African American men have lost the right to vote, seven times the national average.214  
Among the fifteen states examined in this report, Alabama, Arizona, Florida, and Virginia all explicitly 
condition the restoration of voting rights on the repayment of at least some forms of criminal justice debt.215 
In fact, Alabama and Virginia require individuals to pay all fines, restitution, and court costs before they can 
be considered for reinstatement – a dollar amount that can easily reach thousands of dollars.  
Other states, including Georgia and Texas, have ambiguous provisions that require individuals to complete 
their “sentences,” which may potentially include the payment of fines, restitution, or other forms of 
criminal justice debt.216  
Finally, some states – including Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas – disenfranchise people on 
probation, while also allowing the court to extend probation if a defendant has not paid off his or 
her debt by the expiration of the probation term.217 By extending individuals’ probation terms due to 
unpaid debt, courts also effectively continue to deny the right to vote.
These requirements raise serious constitutional concerns and contravene a core principle of our 
democracy – that rich and poor alike have a right to participate in our political system. And by denying 
access to political rights based solely on poverty, states counter efforts to encourage former offenders to 
accept the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
It is in everyone’s interest for people coming out of prison to reintegrate into their communities – to hold 
down stable jobs and housing, to meet obligations to their children and families, to enjoy financial security, 
and to take on the obligations of citizenship. Unfortunately, while states have increasingly recognized that 
fostering successful reentry is a necessary part of criminal justice policy, every state that we examined 
imposes and collects criminal justice debt in a manner that runs directly counter to these goals.  
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An overreliance on criminal just debt coupled with aggressive collection practices also undermines the 
traditional functions of the courts and criminal justice agencies enlisted to collect debt.    
All fifteen of the examined states require courts and probation and parole officers to be involved in 
debt collection in some capacity.218 This practice blurs traditional roles, requiring judges and supervision 
officers to act as collection agents, rather than impartial adjudicators or supervision officers concerned 
with public safety and rehabilitation. In fact, at least eleven states use some criminal fees, fines, or 
penalties to support general revenue funds, treasuries, or funds unrelated to the administration of 
criminal law – effectively turning courts, clerks, and probation officers into general tax collectors.219
A.	 Courts	Face	Conflicts	of	Interest	and	Financial	Uncertainty
States’ increasing reliance on fees to fund court operations raises significant concerns, particularly for 
the judiciary, and goes against the best practices recommended by the American Bar Association and 
other justice experts.220 All of the states studied in this report use criminal justice debt to provide 
budgetary support to courts.
Chief among these concerns is that when courts are over-dependent on fees, such reliance can interfere 
with the judiciary’s independent constitutional role, divert courts’ attention away from their essential 
functions, and, in its most extreme form, threaten the impartiality of judges and other court personnel 
with institutional, pecuniary incentives.221 
Concerns arise, too, when courts are used to collect fees that go to other state functions or general 
revenue. This concern has prompted the Louisiana Supreme Court to strike down fees that are not 
directly connected to the administration of justice on separation of powers grounds, stating that “our 
clerks of court should not be made tax collectors . . . nor should the threshold to our justice system 
be used as a toll booth to collect money for random programs created by the legislature.”222 More 
recently, the court has adhered to this precedent, and focused on the issue of whether a fee relates to 
“administration of justice” in deciding whether it violates separation of powers.223 
Fee revenue can also be unstable. When the operation of the criminal justice process depends too 
heavily on fee revenue, courts risk major disruption when fee revenue goes down.  
New Orleans, for example, faced an extreme version of this phenomenon in the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina when the traffic court fines that it had relied upon to fund the public defender system dried 
up.224 Already underfunded before Katrina, the city’s public defender office faced devastating cuts after 
the depopulation of New Orleans depleted traffic fine revenue. By October of 2005, the office’s staff 
shrunk to 10 attorneys from 35.225  
News reports documented accounts of defendants being kept in jail even after charges against them 
were dropped, or just as troubling, waiting months before their cases were presented.226 In a highly 
publicized decision, one judge, Judge Arthur Hunter, decided to suspend prosecutions and release 
defendants because they were not being provided counsel in a timely fashion.227  
V.  OVERRELIANCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES UNDERMINES THE PROPER ROLES OF 
COURTS AND CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES
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Far from being easy money, then, criminal justice debt puts court officials in the awkward role of becoming 
debt collectors, while creating the potential for financial instability when fee revenue goes down.  
B.	 	Probation	and	Parole	Officers	are	Diverted	from	Their	Public	Safety	and	
Rehabilitation Purposes 
 
The concern about compromising roles is also salient for probation and parole officers. Because some 
form of criminal justice debt is a condition of supervision in all fifteen states, supervision officers are 
involved in collections in each state to varying degrees. Collection-related tasks include monitoring 
payments, setting up payment plans, dunning persons under supervision, and taking punitive actions 
such as reporting failures to pay.228 Even when jurisdictions do not typically seek probation revocation 
solely on the basis of nonpayment, many interviewees reported that supervision officers will threaten 
revocation in an effort to encourage payments.229     
These enforcement responsibilities can be a distraction from the more important duties that probation 
and parole officers have. In particular, given their often crushing caseloads, their highest priority is to 
promote public safety and monitor individuals at risk of re-offending. Supervision officers are aware 
of these consequences and some find debt collection to be at odds with their main purpose: to serve 
society by ensuring that individuals do not commit new offenses.  
These concerns led Virginia to abolish one of its supervision fees in 1994 (though other supervision 
fees remain). Virginia abolished its parole supervision fee, which had been $30 per month, in part 
because it had been “a huge hassle to collect,” according to a Virginia corrections official.230 In addition 
to the problems inherent in requiring parole officers to be fee collectors, the associated administrative 
and accounting tasks made collection by the Department of Corrections too burdensome relative to 
the small amount of revenue generated by the fee.231 Some within the Department, including parole 
officers, objected to the fee and to the parole officers’ role in the collections process, not only because of 
the administrative challenges, but also because collection undermined their other duties. As one official 
stated, “parole officers are not loan sharks.”232
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Criminal justice debt and collection practices are different in each state, but in our analysis of fifteen 
states’ practices, several themes emerged. Many of the problems described in this report arise from states’ 
failure to provide indigence waivers for criminal justice debt. States also consistently failed to consider 
the costs – both human and financial – of aggressive collection practices, including arrests, incarceration, 
the extension of probation terms, and the suspension of driver’s licenses.  Several collections practices 
also raised serious constitutional concerns. We outline below a number of recommendations to address 
these hidden costs.
1.  Lawmakers should evaluate the total debt burden of existing fees before adding new fees 
or increasing fee amounts. Massachusetts provides a good model: on the verge of instituting 
a local jail fee in 2010, the legislature instead established a commission to perform an initial 
investigation of the revenue that could be generated from the fee, the cost of administering and 
collecting the fee, and the impact of the fee on affected populations.
2.  Indigent defendants should be exempt from user fees, and payment plans and other 
debt collection efforts should be tailored to an individual’s ability to pay. States should 
have clear written standards for determining a person’s ability to pay, and screening should 
evaluate genuine financial ability, taking into account other obligations should as child support 
commitments. Individuals who receive public benefits, reside in correctional or mental health 
facilities, or have incomes below a fixed multiple of the federal poverty guidelines should be 
presumed eligible for criminal justice debt waivers.
3.  States should immediately cease incarcerating and jailing individuals for failure to pay 
criminal justice debt, particularly before a court has made an ability-to-pay determination. 
Many people land in jail for debt-related reasons pending a court hearing, even though no one 
has ever determined that they have the ability to pay in the first place. This blatantly unfair 
practice punishes people for being poor and raises significant constitutional questions. 
4.  Public defender fees should be eliminated, to reduce pressures that can lead to conviction 
of the innocent, over-incarceration, and violations of the Constitution. At the very least, 
states should follow the ABA recommendation that individuals should not be ordered to pay 
defender fees they are unable to afford and that states should abolish reimbursement fees that 
require defendants to reimburse the state for all or part of the defender’s services at the end of 
a proceeding.
5.  States should eliminate “poverty penalties” that impose additional costs on individuals 
who are unable to pay criminal justice debt all at once, such as payment plan fees, late 
fees, collection fees, and interest. These fees unfairly burden the poor and contribute to 
spiraling debt for many individuals. Collection fees that benefit private collection agencies are 
particularly troubling, because these agencies generally lack oversight and charge high fees.
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS
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6.  Policymakers should evaluate the costs of popular debt collection methods such as arrests, 
incarceration, and driver’s license suspensions – including the salary and time spent by 
employees involved in collection and the effect of the methods on reentry and recidivism. 
States are in the best position to evaluate the costs of collection, because they have better access to 
information about the salaries of court officials, supervision officers, and other collection officials 
and data on the operating costs of courts, jails, and prisons.
7.  Agencies involved in debt collection should extend probation terms or suspend driver’s 
licenses only in those cases where an individual can afford to repay criminal justice debt 
but refuses to do so. These practices undermine individuals’ reentry into their communities 
by increasing the likelihood of new offenses and undermining employment and housing 
opportunities. 
8.  Legislatures should eliminate poll taxes that deny individuals the right to vote when 
they are unable to pay criminal justice debt. Denying individuals the right to vote based 
on a failure to pay criminal justice debt raises serious constitutional concerns and counters 
efforts to encourage former offenders to accept the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. It 
also contravenes a core principle of our democracy – that rich and poor alike have a right to 
participate in our political system.  
9.  Courts should offer community service programs that build job skills for individuals 
unable to afford criminal justice debt. Well-designed community service programs promote 
reentry and help individuals avoid long-term debts that keep them entangled with the justice 
system. Community service options for debt should be widely available, but should only be 
imposed at the defendant’s request, or when an unemployed defendant has been unable to 
make payments.    
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9  42 U.S.C. § 17501(b)(18) (Second Chance Act findings).
10  Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation – August 2010 at 1, 24 (2010), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
11  Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Profile of Nonviolent Offenders Exiting State 
Prisons 2 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pnoesp.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2010).
12  42 U.S.C. § 17501(b)(3) (Second Chance Act Findings).
13  Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s 
Criminal Justice Fees 5-6 (2010).  
14  Alan Rosenthal & Marsha Weissman, Center for Community Alternatives, Sentencing for Dollars: The 
Financial Consequences of a Criminal Conviction 13-16 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.brennancenter.
org/content/resource/sentencing_for_dollars_the_financial_consequences_of_a_criminal_conviction/. 
15  Ctr. for Cmty. Alternatives, Increased Mandatory Surcharges and Crime Victims Assistance Fees 
(2008), available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/fees%20chart.pdf; see also N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law 
§ 1809-e.
16  Ctr. for Cmty. Alternatives, Increased Mandatory Surcharges and Crime Victims Assistance 
Fees (2008), available at http://www.communityalternatives.org/pdf/fees%20chart.pdf; see also 
N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1809(1)(b)(i) (surcharge for felony conviction increased from $250 to 
$300); § 1809(1)(b)(ii) (surcharge for misdemeanor conviction increased from $140 to $175); 
N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a)(iii) (surcharge for conviction of a violation increased from $75 to $95). 
17  See N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, Court Costs and Fees Chart (2009), available at http://www.nccourts.org/
Courts/Trial/Documents/court_costs_chart-2009-criminal.pdf.
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18  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 36-21-67 (imposing $1 costs for a traffic infraction, $5 for a misdemeanor or violation of 
a municipal ordinance, and $10 for a felony to be allocated to the Peace Officers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund), 
§ 12-19-181 (assessing additional fees for drug-related convictions); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 12-116.01(A) – (C) 
(imposing additional surcharges on every fine penalty and forfeiture imposed); § 16-954(C) (assessing an additional 
10 percent surcharge on criminal fines to be deposited into a clean elections fund); Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4(b) 
(imposing restitution fine upon conviction ); Fla. Stat. § 938.03(1), (4) ($50 fee for all criminal convictions, $49 
of which is deposited in the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund); § 142.01(1); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-21-73(a)-(b) 
(imposing additional surcharges on top of original fines to be paid into the Peace Officers’ Annuity and Benefit 
Fund); § 17-11-1 (the costs of a prosecution may be entered against a defendant after conviction); 625 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. 5/16-104d (imposing an additional $20 fee for those convicted of serious traffic violations, to be dispersed 
into various funds); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/124A-5 (convicted defendants must pay for costs of prosecution 
and other reasonable costs, such as those incurred by the Sheriff for serving arrest warrants); La.  Code Crim. 
Proc. Ann. art. 887(A) (cost of prosecution);; Mich. Comp. Laws § 780.905 (outlining mandatory surcharges); 
§ 769.1f(1) (authorizing courts to order convicted defendants to reimburse the costs of prosecution); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 595.045(8) (assessing fees, the amount of which determined by the severity of the crime, to be paid to the 
crime victims’ compensation fund); N.Y. Penal Law § 60.35(1)(a) (imposing ,mandatory surcharges ranging from 
$95 to $300, depending on severity of offense); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-304 (listing costs upon conviction); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2949.091(A) (imposing fees of up to $30 for felonies to go toward the indigent defense support 
fund); § 2947.23(A)(1)-(2) (imposing costs of prosecution and juror fees in criminal cases); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 11.1101(b)(1)-(2) (imposing costs of at least $60 upon conviction); 16 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1403 (“In 
any case where a defendant is convicted and sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution and trial, the expenses of the 
district attorney in connection with such prosecution shall be considered a part of the costs of the case and be paid 
by the defendant.”); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.004(a) (requiring defendants convicted by a jury to pay 
a jury fee of up to $20); 102.005(a) ($ 40 court clerk fee at conviction.”); Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-275.1 to -275.4 
(depositing portions of various conviction fees into funds such as the Criminal Injuries Compensation Fund and 
the Virginia Crime Victim-Witness Fund); § 17.1-275.5(A)(2), (7), (13) (authorizing the court clerk to assess fees 
for trial transcripts, jury costs, and courthouse security to convicted defendants).
19  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 15-22-2(a) ($30 fee for probation or parole); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-466(A) (assessing 
supervision fees $65 - $75); Cal. Penal Code §§ 1203.1b(a), 1203.1e(a)-(b) (defendant must pay all or a portion 
of probation costs or parole supervision costs, based on ability to pay); Fla. Stat. § 948.09(requiring persons on 
probation, parole and other supervision to pay costs of supervision); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-34(d)(1) ($23 a month 
probation fee); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-6-3(i) ($50 monthly probation fee); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 
895(A) (imposing probation supervision fee); Mich. Comp. Laws § 771.3c(1) (probation supervision fee based on 
projected monthly income, up to $135 per month); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 217.690(3) (authorizing fee of up to $60 
per month for supervision); N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-a(9)(a) (monthly $30 supervision fee for those on presumptive 
release, parole, conditional release or post-release supervision); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1343(c1)$30 monthly fee 
for supervised probation); § 15A-1374(c) ($30 monthly supervision fee for persons on parole); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2951.021(A)(1) ($50 monthly probation fee can be required ); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 11.1102(c) 
(minimum $25 monthly supervision fee for parole and probation); Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.182(a)(1)-(2), 
508.182(f ) (imposing a monthly parole supervision fee of $10 and administrative fee of $8); Va. Code Ann. § 
19.2-303.3(D) (imposing costs of supervision for community-based probation).
20  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 14-6-22(a)(1)-(3) (imposing jail fee of up to $20 per day in misdemeanor cases, which may 
be remitted upon a showing of hardship); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-804.01 (imposing a fee, based on the costs 
of incarceration and the person’s ability to pay, for those convicted of a misdemeanor); § 31-239(A) (assessing 
a monthly utility fee of up to $2 for a prisoner’s consumption of electricity); Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1c(a) 
(authorizing courts to assess a fee local jail stays as a condition of probation or conditional sentence after determining 
defendant’s ability to pay); § 1203.1m(a) (authorizing courts to impose a fee on those in state prison after making 
a determination of ability to pay); Fla. Stat. § 951.033(2)-(3) (authorizing detention facilities to determine the 
financial status of prisoners and require prisoners to pay all or a portion of daily subsistence costs); Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 42-1-4(d) (deducting “an amount determined to be the cost of the inmate’s keep and confinement” from the 
earnings of inmates participating in a work-release program); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 125/20(a) (allowing county 
boards to require prisoners in their jails to reimburse the county for incarceration costs based on ability to pay); 5/3-
7-6(a) (“Committed persons shall be responsible to reimburse the Department [of Corrections] for the expenses 
incurred by their incarceration at a rate to be determined by the Department . . . .”); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. 
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art 890.2(A)-(B) (the court may impose on persons convicted of a felony the expected costs of imprisonment 
after a determination of ability to pay); Mich. Comp. Laws § 801.83(1)(a), (3) (authorizing counties to seek 
reimbursement of up to $60 per day of imprisonment after determining individual’s financial status); Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 221.070 (persons committed to county jails shall bear the expense of being carried to the jail and being 
supported while in jail); N.Y. Correct. Law § 189(2) (authorizing incarceration fee of up to $1 per week to be 
collected from compensation paid to a prisoner for work performed; expires Sept. 1, 2011); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
7A-313 (imposing a fee of $5 for every twenty-four hours of confinement in jail while awaiting trial; the fee is 
not collected if the defendant is not convicted); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2929.18(A)(5)(a)(ii), 2929.28(A)(3)
(a)(ii) (imposing the costs of confinement on prisoners staying in both local jails and state prisons); 61 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 3303(a) (requiring inmates to pay a fee to cover a portion of costs of medical services provided 
while imprisoned); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 42.038(a), (c) (authorizing courts that sentence a defendant 
convicted of a misdemeanor to serve time in a county jail to assess a fee of $25 per day, which can be waived if the 
defendant is found to be indigent); art 104.002(d) (requiring prisoners to pay for medical, dental, or health-related 
services received while in a county jail); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-131.3 (authorizing inmate fee, not to exceed $3 
per day, to defray the costs associated with confinement).
21  Carl Reynolds et al., Tex. Office of Court Admin., A Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Restitution, 
and Child Support are Assessed and Collected from People Convicted of Crimes, Interim Report 8 
(2009), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/debts/pdf/TexasFinancialObligationsInterimReport.pdf.
22  County Clerk’s Misdemeanor Court Cost Chart – 1/01/2010, available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/pdf/
CC-CRFeeChartOriginalJurisdiction2010.pdf; District Clerk’s Felony Court Cost Chart – 1/01/2010, available at 
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/pdf/DC-CRFeeChart2010.pdf.
23  Arizona state law specifies three surcharges to be imposed on all fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed for criminal 
offenses. These surcharges are 47 percent, 7 percent, and 7 percent. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-116.01(A)-(C). The 
surcharges may be waived by the court to avoid working a hardship on the defendant or the defendant’s family and 
they must be waived to the extent that underlying fine or penalty is waived.  § 12-116.01(F). However, surcharges 
imposed on fines and certain assessments for driving under the influence may not be waived. § 28-1389. Also, 
section 12-116.02(A) imposes an additional 13 percent surcharge under the same conditions and pursuant to the 
same waiver rules as section 12-116.01. An additional surcharge of 10 percent is imposed on all civil and criminal 
fines and penalties collected under section 12-116.01 and deposited into the clean elections fund. § 16-954(C).
24  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-114.01(A).
25 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-116(A).
26  At least 7 states have fees that vary by locality. Alabama: While Alabama law provides that court fees for criminal 
cases in the circuit and district courts should generally be uniform, Ala. Code § 12-19-20, courts do charge 
additional local costs. For example, Macon County has a $30 jail fee and a $2 juvenile fee. Telephone Interview 
with Veronica Harris, Macon County Circuit Court (Nov. 2, 2009). Pike County has a $21 district attorney fee, a 
$1 law library fee, a $2 fee for the juvenile fund. Telephone Interview with Peggy McVay, Court Clerk, Pike County 
Dist. Court (Nov. 5, 2009). Also, municipal governing bodies may assess additional costs and fees in municipal 
court, up to the amount assessed in the district court of the county. Ala. Code § 11-47-7.1(a).  California: Some 
state statutes permit counties to authorize additional charges. See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1465.5 (authorizing 
counties to adopt a resolution imposing an additional 20 percent assessment on fines levied against certain vehicular 
violations). Georgia: Some state laws allow counties to impose additional fees if they meet the statute’s criteria.  See, 
e.g., Ga. Code Ann. §§ 15-21-92 to -93 (authorizing counties to charge an additional fee constituting 10 percent 
of the fine imposed as long as the county meets certain criteria ); Ga. Code Ann. § 36-15-9(a) (authorizing a local 
fee of not more than $5 for establishing and maintaining a county law library if a need for one exists). Illinois: 
Under state law, many court costs differ based upon county population size. See 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/27.1a(w)
(1), 105/27.2(w)(1), 105/27.2a(w)(1). When state law provides for a fee range, counties can choose the amount to 
impose.  See 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/27.1a, 105/27.2, 105/27.2a. In Louisiana: State law provides for many fees 
that vary by district.  See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:965 (authorizing a fee of up to $10 towards an indigent 
transcript fund in the Nineteenth Judicial District). Ohio: Court costs are generally uniform, but some statutes 
allow counties to impose additional costs for specific purposes. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2949.093(C) 
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(allowing counties that elect to participate in a “criminal justice regional information system” to collect additional 
court costs of up to $5); see also Telephone Interview with Dan Horrigan, Summit County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 
3, 2009) (noting that most court costs are standard across counties). Texas: Fees are generally uniform and must be 
authorized by state statute, but some statutes provide that counties may collect additional local fees under certain 
circumstances. See, e.g., Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.009 (authorizing counties with a population of 3.3 
million or more to collect court costs of up to $7 for each conviction of a Class C misdemeanor).      
27  La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 887(F)(2).
28  Alan Rosenthal & Marsha Weissman, Center for Community Alternatives, Sentencing for Dollars: The 
Financial Consequences of a Criminal Conviction 16 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.brennancenter.
org/content/resource/sentencing_for_dollars_the_financial_consequences_of_a_criminal_conviction/. 
29  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1381(I)(4)-(5) (requiring defendants to pay $500 to a prison construction and operation 
fund and $500 to a public safety equipment fund, in addition to all other fees).
30 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-179(h1).
31  California: those that are convicted under or violate California’s driving under the influence statute may apply 
for a restricted driver’s license after a certain period of time. One condition of a restricted driver’s license is the 
maintenance of an ignition interlock device. Cal. Veh. Code § 13352(3)-(9). Illinois: those convicted of driving 
under the influence of alcohol or other drugs may be granted a monitoring device driving permit, or MDDP. 
Anyone with an MDDP must, at his or her own expense, drive only vehicles equipped with an ignition interlock 
device. 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/6-206.1(a)-(a-1). New York: Persons convicted under New York’s driving under 
the influence statutes must, as a condition of probation or a conditional license, install and maintain an ignition 
interlock device. Those subject to this condition must bear the costs, but as of August 2010, the cost may be waived 
or imposed pursuant to a payment plan if the person is unable to afford the device. N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law §§ 
1198(2)(a), (3)(a), (4)(a). Virginia: as a condition of a restricted license or license restoration, a court may order for 
the first offense and must order for the second or any subsequent offense or when the offender’s blood alcohol level 
is above 0.15 percent, a functioning, certified ignition interlock system to be installed for at least six months. Va. 
Code Ann. § 18.2-270.1(B). In addition, the court clerk shall assess any court costs related to an ignition interlock 
device. § 17.1-275.5(A)(10). 
32  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 § 19(i); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-6-3(19)(i-5).
33  Memorandum from Rebecca Bers, Orleans Pub. Defender, Chart of Fines and Fees Authorized (on file with the 
Brennan Center).
34  Telephone Interview with Donald Johnson, Chief State Defender, Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, Inc., Detroit, 
Michigan (Dec. 10, 2009).
35  Telephone Interview with Paula Taylor, Fin. Dir., 17th Circuit Court, Michigan (Dec. 10, 2009).
36  See Massachusetts FY 2011 Budget Summary, Outside Section 177, Inmate Fee Schedule, http://www.mass.gov/bb/
gaa/fy2011/os_11/h177.htm.
37  Of the surveyed states, every state but Pennsylvania and New York utilizes defender fees. Alabama: See Ala. Code § 
15-12-25(a) (“A court may require a convicted defendant to pay the fees of court appointed counsel.”). Arizona: See 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-584(C)-(E) (court may order a $25 administrative assessment or require the defendant to pay 
a reasonable amount to reimburse the county for the cost of the person’s legal services). California: See Cal. Penal 
Code § 987.5 ($50 registration fee); Cal. Gov’t Code § 27712 (court may require defendant to pay all or part of 
the costs of legal assistance). Florida: Fla. Stat. § 938.29(1)(a) (attorney’s fees and costs shall be set in all cases at no 
less than $50 per case for misdemeanors or criminal traffic offenses and no less than $100 per case for felonies); Fla. 
Stat. § 27.52(1)(b)-(c) ($50 application fee). Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 15-21A-6(c) ($50 application fee), Ga. 
Code Ann. § 17-12-51 (court may impose as a condition of probation repayment of all or a portion of the cost for 
providing legal representation and other defense expenses). Illinois : 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/113-3.1 (may order 
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defendant to pay a reasonable sum to reimburse state or county, not to exceed $500 for misdemeanors and $5,000 
for felonies). Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:175(A)(1)(f ) ($40 application fee); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §15:176 
(“To the extent that a person is financially able to provide for an attorney, other necessary services, and facilities of 
representation and court costs, the court shall order him to pay for these items.”). Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws 
§ 769.1k (the court may impose the expenses of providing legal assistance to the defendant). Missouri: Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 600.090(1) (if defendant is able to provide a limited cash contribution toward the cost of his representation, 
or if later he or she becomes able, that contribution shall be required). North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7A-455 (if financially able, required to pay portion of legal services); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7A-455.1 ($60 
appointment fee). Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.51(D) (defendant shall pay the county an amount that 
the person reasonably can be expected to pay); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 120.36(A)(1) ($25 application fee). Texas: 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.05 (if financially able, required to pay all or part of legal services). Virginia: Va. 
Code Ann. § 19.2-163.4:1 (defendant charged the sum that would have been allowed a court-appointed attorney 
as compensation and as reasonable expenses). Another recent survey indicates that nationally, twenty five states and 
two counties charge defendants an application fee for exercising the right to counsel. Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. 
Logan, The Political Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2045, 2052 
(2006).
38  See Fla. Stat. Ann § 27.52(1)(b); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 120.36(A)(1).
39  See Fla. Stat. §§ 938.29(1)(a), 27.52(1)(b)-(c); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7A-455, -455.1; Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
163.4:1.
40  See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7A-455, -455.1. Moreover, if the court determines that an indigent defendant is 
currently capable of paying a portion of the value of the legal services provided, the court must order that payment. 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.. § 7A-455(a). These fees are mandatory. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7A-455, -455.1. 
Despite the mandatory provisions, however, some judges nonetheless waive or remit the reimbursement provision, 
citing constitutional concerns. Telephone Interview with Danielle Carman, Assistant Dir., N.C. Office of Indigent 
Def. Servs. (Nov. 20, 2009). Repayment may also be made a condition of probation. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 
15A-1343(10).
41  Telephone Interview with Margaret Gressens, Dir. of Research, N.C. Office of Indigent Def. Servs. (Nov. 10, 
2009).
42  See Telephone Interview with Terry Rohr, Clerk, Bristol Circuit Court (Dec. 28, 2009) (defendants are charged 
$1,235 per count for Class 1 and 2 felonies, and $445 per count for Class 3-6 felonies). Other Virginia jurisdictions 
have different collection regimes. For example, in Norfolk Circuit Court, appointed counsel are contracted for 
felony defense at a variable rate per hour, while defendants are charged $112 per count for misdemeanor defense. 
Telephone Interview with Tara Relendia, Deputy Pub. Defender, Norfolk Circuit Court (Jan. 5, 2010).
43  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 11-584(D); State v. Taylor, 166 P.3d 118, 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).
44  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Tim Armbruster, Chief Deputy Legal Defender, Pima County (Nov. 16, 2009); 
Telephone Interview with Dolores Corral, Fin. Specialist, Clerk of the Superior Court, Yuma County (Nov. 17, 
2009).
45  For example, Yuma and Coconino counties have set rates that judges use when requiring reimbursement. Telephone 
Interview with Dolores Corral, Fin. Specialist, Clerk of the Superior Court, Yuma County (Nov. 17, 2009); 
Telephone Interview with Sue McLean, Office Manager, Coconino County Public Defender (Nov. 16, 2009). Not 
all jurisdictions use set rates, however. Navajo, Pima, and Mohave counties appear to modify and adjust the amount 
of reimbursement for the services of a public defender on a case-by-case basis. Telephone Interview with Juanita 
Mann, Clerk of the Superior Court, Navajo County,(Nov. 19, 2009); Telephone Interview with Tim Armbruster, 
Chief Deputy Legal Defender, Pima County. (Nov. 16, 2009); Telephone Interview with Virlynn Tinnel, Clerk 
of the Superior Court, Mohave County (Nov. 17, 2009) (according to Ms. Tinnel, there has been discussion of 
moving towards a more uniform fee structure for reimbursement).
46  National Legal Aid & Defender Association, A Race to the Bottom 32-33 (2009), available at http://www.
mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_report.pdf.
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47 Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 45-46 (1974).
48  See State v. Dudley, 766 N.W.2d 606, 614-15 (Iowa 2009) (finding Iowa’s mandatory reimbursement statute 
violated the right to counsel under the U.S. and Iowa constitutions because it lacked the safeguards in Fuller); 
State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403, 410-11 (Minn. 2004) (same conclusion with respect to Minnesota’s mandatory 
contribution statute); State v. Morgan, 789 A.2d 928, 931 (Vt. 2001) (holding “that, under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, before imposing an obligation to reimburse the state, the court must make a 
finding that the defendant is or will be able to pay the reimbursement amount...”); Hanson v. Passer, 13 F.3d 275, 
279 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that “it is constitutionally permissible to require the defendant to repay the expense 
incurred by the state in providing the representation …so long as “[t]hose who remain indigent or for whom 
repayment would work ‘manifest hardship’ are forever exempt from any obligation to repay.”) (quoting Fuller, 417 
U.S. at 53); Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he entity deciding whether to require 
repayment must take cognizance of the individual’s resources…and the hardships he or his family will endure if 
repayment is required” in order to ensure that indigent defendants are not required to pay); Olson v. James, 603 
F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding a mandatory reimbursement statute unconstitutional because it did not 
distinguish between indigent and non-indigent defendants). But see State v. Blank, 930 P.2d 1213, 1219-20 (Wash. 
1997) (en banc) (holding that the Constitution does not require a prior determination of defendant’s ability to 
pay, but that before enforced collection or any sanction is imposed for nonpayment, there must be an inquiry into 
ability to pay); State v. Albert, 899 P.2d 103, 111 (Alaska 1995) (same); State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465, 473 
(N.D.1982) (same).
49  ABA, Guidelines on Contribution Fees for Costs of Counsel in Criminal Cases, Guideline 2, 2 (Aug. 2004), 
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/rec110.pdf.
50  Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s 
Criminal Justice Fees 9 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/FloridaF%26F.
pdf?nocdn=1.
51  See Cynthia Miller & Virginia Knox, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, The Challenge 
of Helping Low-Income Fathers Support Their Children 23-24 (2001).     
52  Although it is possible that mandatory fees exist in Ohio, Brennan Center research did not uncover any mandatory 
fees.  
53  See Alabama: Ala. Code § 32-6-18(a) ($50 penalty assessment for unlicensed driving, used to support the Traffic 
Safety Trust Fund and the Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission Fund); Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 13-3821(Q) ($250 sex offender registration fee); California: Cal. Pen Code § 1464 ($10 penalty assessment 
per every $10, or part of $10, of fines, penalties, and forfeitures imposed for criminal offenses); Florida: Fla. Stat. 
§ 938.03(1) ($50 fee for all criminal offenses); Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 15-21-73(a)(1) (additional penalty 
assessment in every case where the court imposes a fine, including costs, summing to 10 percent of the original 
fine plus the lesser of $50 or 10 percent of the original fine); Illinois: 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/27-6(b) ($100 
fee for cases involving driving under the influence); Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 16.16 ($10 fee imposed in 
all criminal cases over which the district attorney’s office has jurisdiction, except in parish of Orleans); Michigan: 
Mich. Comp.Laws § 780.905(1)(a)-(b) ($60 fee for felonies; $50 fee for certain misdemeanors); Missouri: Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 595.045(8) ($68 fee for class A or B felonies; $46 fee for class C or D felonies; $10 fee for certain 
misdemeanors); New York: N.Y. Pen Law § 60.35(a)(i)-(ii) ($300 felony fee; $175 misdemeanor fee, subject to 
exemption where offenders make restitution or reparation); North Carolina: N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-455.1(a)-(b) 
($50 appointed counsel fee in criminal cases resulting in conviction); Pennsylvania: 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  § 
11.1101(a)(1) ($60 minimum court costs fee in criminal cases resulting in plea or conviction); Texas: Tex. Local 
Gov’t Code Ann. § 133.102(a) (court cost fee of $133 for felonies, $83 for misdemeanors; $40 for nonjailable 
misdemeanors); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-275.1 ($350 fixed felony fee). 
54  See, e.g., E-mail from Miguel Santiago, Defender, Office of the Ohio Public Defender (Oct. 16, 2009, 10:10:00 
EST); Telephone Interview with Dan Horrigan, Summit County Clerk of Courts, Ohio (Nov. 3, 2009).
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55  Alabama: If the defendant fails to pay a fine and/or restitution, the court may reduce or waive the fees after they are 
imposed. Specifically the court may “[r]educe the fine to an amount the defendant is able to pay,” “[c]ontinue or 
modify the schedule of payments of the fine and/or restitution,” or “[r]elease the defendant from obligation to pay the 
fine.”  Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(h)(1), (2), (5). However, the same statute authorizes courts to incarcerate defendants 
until unpaid penalties are paid (after examining the reasons for nonpayment) and order employers to withhold 
amounts from wages. 26.11(h)(3), (4). Arizona: Courts have the power to modify the way in which restitution, 
fines, fees or incarceration costs are to be paid, but rarely do so in practice. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-810(E)(1); 
Telephone Interview with Gordon Mulleneaux, Assoc. Clerk of Cash & Fins., Maricopa County Superior Court 
(Nov. 18, 2009). California: See Cal. Penal Code § 1464(d) (“In any case where a person convicted of any offense, 
to which this section applies, is in prison until the fine is satisfied, the judge may waive all or any part of the state 
penalty, the payment of which would work a hardship on the person convicted or his or her immediate family.”). 
Georgia: Interviews indicate that some judges  will change the terms of probation for defendants that become 
unable to pay off debt. See Telephone Interview with Robert Persse, Defender, Ogeechee Circuit Public Defender’s 
Office (Nov. 6, 2009); Telephone Interview with Claudia Saari, Interim Circuit Public Defender, DeKalb County 
(Oct. 23, 2009). Illinois: Courts have the statutory authority, upon showing of good cause, to revoke unpaid fines 
or modify the method of payment. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-9-2. Louisiana: Judges have the authority to suspend 
court costs. La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 887(A) (“[A]ny judge of a district court, parish court, city court, 
traffic court, juvenile court, family court, or magistrate of a mayor’s court within the state shall be authorized to 
suspend court costs.”). Michigan: A probationer who is required to pay certain costs can petitition the sentencing 
judge for remission of such costs. Mich. Comp. Laws § 771.3(6)(b). Similarly, defendants who owe restitution can 
petition the sentencing judge to modify the method of payment.  § 769.1a(12). Missouri: A defendant can petition 
the sentencing court to revoke a fine or modify a payment method if “it appears to the satisfaction of the court that 
the circumstances which warranted the imposition of the fine no longer exist or that it would otherwise be unjust 
to require payment of the fine.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 560.036. If a defendant defaults on the payment of a fine and 
the default is “excusable,” the court can offer the defendant additional time to pay, reduce the amount of the fine, 
or revoke the fine.  § 560.031(3). New York: Sentencing courts have the authority to remit certain fines, restitution 
or reparation. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 420.30. North Carolina: Statutes authorize the sentencing court to remit 
or revoke debt after sentencing, either based on a petition by the defendant or prosecutor or default on the part of 
the defendant. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1363, -1364(c). Pennsylvania: Judges in some counties will reduce or 
waive criminal debt for good behavior or if defendant is making a good-faith effort to repay the debt. Telephone 
Interview with Art Ettinger, Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Alleghany County (Oct. 29, 
2009).  Texas: Courts may waive fines imposed on a defendant who defaults if the defendant is indigent. Tex. Code 
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.091(1). However, fines can only be waived if alternative methods, such as confinement or 
working “in the county jail industries program, in the workhouse, or on the county farm,” would impose an undue 
hardship on the defendant.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.09(a), 43.091(2).
56  Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews with 
public defenders and collection officials).
57 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-358(C).
58  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Gary Williams, Clerk, Sussex Circuit Court, Virginia (Jan. 5, 2010); Telephone 
interview, Diane Blackburn, Deputy Clerk, Buckingham Circuit Court, Virginia (Dec. 28, 2009). 
59  Access to Justice Program, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Eligible for Justice: 
Guidelines for Appointing Defense Counsel 5 (2008), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/
publications/Eligibility.Report.es.pdf.
60  Alabama: Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(d); Telephone Interview with Cindy, Clerk, Circuit Criminal Court of Jefferson 
County (Nov. 2, 2009); Telephone Interview with Veronica Harris, Clerk, Circuit Court of Macon County (Nov. 
2, 2009). Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-116. California: Cal. Penal Code § 1205(a) (allowing a court to impose 
a payment plan for misdemeanor convictions). Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 28.246(4). Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. 
§ 42-8-34.1(f ). Illinois: Judges set payment plans for restitution payments to victims. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-
5-6(f ). Judges can also extend payment schedules at compliance review hearings. Otherwise, clerks or probation 
and parole officers work out a payment plan with defendants. Telephone Interview with Lester Finkle, Assistant 
Pub. Defender, Cook County Public Defender (Oct. 29, 2009). Louisiana: In Orleans district, defendants are set 
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up on a monthly payment plan for the fees and fines assessed at sentencing. Telephone Interview with Rebecca 
Bers, Defender, Orleans Pub. Defender (Aug. 5, 2009); Telephone Interview with Collections Dep’t, New Orleans 
Criminal Court (Aug. 11, 2009). Michigan: Mich. Ct. R. 1.110; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 769.1a(10); 769.1f(4); 
771.3(7). Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 543.270(2). New York: N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 420.10 (governing collection 
of fines, restitution, or reparation). North Carolina: The court may order a payment plan or delegate a probation 
officer with the responsibility to set up a payment plan. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-304(f ); 15A-1340.36(b); 
15A-1343(c1)-(c2); 15A-1362(b). Ohio: Payment plans are set up for both misdemeanors and felonies. See, e.g., 
Telephone Interview with Dan Horrigan, Summit County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 3, 2009); Telephone Interview 
with Barbara Cannon, Deputy Clerk, Greene County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 2, 2009). Dayton Municipal Court 
permits defendants to pay half the balance and get a 30-day extension for the second half. Telephone Interview 
with Rita Orlowski, Central Payments Office Supervisor, Dayton Municipal Clerk of Court (Oct. 30, 2009). 
Franklin County Municipal Court allows defendants to break up the balance owed into 12 monthly payments. 
Telephone Interview with Matt Davenport, Accounting/Fin. Supervisor, Franklin Municipal Clerk of Court (Nov. 
25, 2009). Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania law provides for installment plans to be imposed at sentencing, as well as 
following default. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9758(b); § 9730(b)(3); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1106(c)(2)
(ii);  Pa. R. Crim. P. 414(C)(5); 706.  Texas: There are payment plans in many jurisdictions under Texas’s Collection 
Improvement Program. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.0033; 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 175.1 (establishing 
collection mechanisms in counties and municipalities meeting certain population thresholds). Judges also have 
authority under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.15 to require the defendant to pay when the fees and fines are 
imposed, to pay at a later date, or can require payment in installments. Virginia: Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-354(A).
61  Memorandum from the Mich. State Court Admin. Office on Collection Policy for Fines, Costs, and Other 
Assessments Due to the Court, available at http://courts.michigan.gov/scao/services/collections/Policies/
SampleCourtPolicies/DistrictCourtCollectionPolicy.pdf. 
62  Telephone Interview with Susan Hopkins, Clerk, Louisa Circuit Court (Jan. 4, 2010); Telephone Interview with 
Brandy Duncan, Supervisor, Clerk’s Office, Roanoke Circuit Court (Dec. 21, 2009).
63  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 28.246(4).
64  Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s 
Criminal Justice Fees 14 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/FloridaF%26F.
pdf?nocdn=1. 
65  Nine states have either a practice of charging for payment plans or a statute authorizing charges. Arizona: $20 fee for 
each payment plan imposed. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-116(a). California: Counties can charge for setting up a 
payment plan. For example, in San Francisco the charge is $35 to set up a payment plan. Telephone Interview with 
Sangeeta Sinha, Deputy Pub. Defender, S.F. Pub. Defender’s Office (Dec. 17, 2009). Florida: Clerks can charge 
debtors $25 to enroll in a payment plan, or an additional $5 charge per month. Fla. Stat. §§ 28.24(26)(b)-26(c). 
At least one county exceeds this amount, charging $135 to apply for the payment program. Telephone Interview 
with Bob Young, Gen. Counsel, 10th Judicial Circuit Office of the Pub. Defender (July 23, 2007). Louisiania: 
There is a $100 payment plan fee in New Orleans. Telephone Interview with Rebecca Bers, Orleans Pub. Defender 
(Dec. 2, 2009). North Carolina: $20 fee to set up a payment plan setup.  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-304(F). Ohio: 
Practices vary. The county courts in Franklin, Summit, and Green do not charge for payment plans. See Telephone 
Interview with Sherry Bova, Budget Office Manager, Franklin County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 2, 2009); Telephone 
Interview with Dan Horrigan, Summit County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 3, 2009); Telephone Interview with Barbara 
Cannon, Deputy Clerk, Greene County Clerk of Courts (November 2, 2009). In Franklin County Municipal 
Court, a defendant utilizing a payment plan must pay $50 up front – a $25 fee for establishing a payment plan, 
and $25 toward the balance. Telephone Interview with Matt Davenport, Supervisor, Accounting/Fin. Div., Franklin 
Municipal Clerk of Court (Nov. 25, 2009). Pennsylvania: Practices vary. At least one jurisdiction (Centre County) 
charges $32 for installment plans.  Telephone Interview with David Crowley, Defender, Centre County, Penn. (Oct. 
23, 2009). In Philadelphia, there is no charge. Telephone Interview with Daniel Bartoli, Defender, Defender Ass’n 
of Phila. County (Oct. 27, 2009). Texas: Defendants may be required to pay a one-time $12 fee if restitution is 
collected in installments.  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037(g)(1). Defendants also can be required to pay a 
$2 transaction fee for each payment transaction. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.072. Virginia: Defendants 
may be assessed a fee of up to $10 if they are placed in a payment plan. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-354(A).
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66  Telephone Interview with Rebecca Bers, Defender, Orleans Pub. Defender (Dec. 2, 2009); Phone Interview, Matt 
Davenport, Accounting/Fin. Supervisor, Franklin Municipal Clerk of Court (Nov. 25, 2009).
67  Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s 
Criminal Justice Fees 23 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Justice/FloridaF%26F.
pdf?nocdn=1.
68  See Ga. Code Ann., § 17-10-1(d). Interviewees in Georgia indicated that community service did not apply to all 
financial obligations in their jurisdictions. For example, the Ogeechee Public Defender has never seen community 
service imposed in lieu of a court fee. Telephone Interview with Robert Persse, Pub. Defender, Ogeechee Circuit 
Pub. Defender’s Office (Oct. 29, 2009). A Gwinnett County probation officer stated that he had seen community 
service ordered in lieu of a fine, and in lieu of an overdue probation supervision fee, but in no other context. 
Telephone Interview with Henry Goodman, Probation Officer (Oct. 29, 2009).
69  Brennan Center research did not identify any statute authorizing a community service option in North Carolina, 
and interviewees indicated that no option is available in practice. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, 
Assoc. Counsel, N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts (Nov. 20, 2009); Telephone Interview with Emily Harrell, 
Assistant Pub. Defender, Buncombe County (Nov. 20, 2009).
70  N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1371(i); § 143B-262.4(b). See also Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, Assoc. 
Counsel, N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts (Nov. 20, 2009).
71  Telephone Interview with Margaret Degen, Assistant Pub. Defender, Jackson County (Oct. 28, 2009).
72 Telephone Interview with Michelle (last name withheld on request), Los Alamitos, California (June 16, 2010).
73  Practices vary. For example, in Macon County, the judge can allow the defendant to perform community services 
in lieu of fees or fines, but only does so in traffic cases. Telephone Interview with Veronica Harris, Macon County 
Circuit Clerk (Nov. 2, 2009). In Pike County, community service is not utilized in practice. Telephone Interview 
with Peggy McVay, Pike County Dist. Court Clerk (Nov. 5, 2009). In Tuscaloosa, judges will sometimes allow 
defendants to do community service in lieu of fines. Telephone Interview with Gerry Hudson, Pub. Defenders of 
Tuscaloosa (Oct. 29, 2009). Some statutes explicitly give judges the discretion to order community service in lieu 
of fees. See, e.g. Ala. Code § 12-23-18.
74  There is no statutory mechanism for the performance of community service in lieu of fees and fines. Moreover, all 
interviewees who were asked agreed that there is no option for performing community service in lieu of fees or fines. 
See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Virlynn Tinnel, Clerk of the Mohave County Superior Court (Nov. 17, 2009); 
Telephone interview with Tricia Caincimino, Fin. Manager, Clerk of Graham County Superior Court (Nov. 13, 
2009).
75  See Marcus Nieto, Cal. Research Bureau, Cal. State Library, Who Pays for Penalty Assessment Programs 
in California? 19-26 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/03/06-003.pdf (stating that judges 
can impose community service in place of fines and fees). Practices in California vary. In Los Angeles Criminal 
Court, clerk and public defender said community service is available as an alternative at sentencing and upon failure 
to pay fines, but not fees. Telephone Interview with Jessica, Court Manager; Los Angeles Criminal Court (Oct. 29, 
2009) (last name withheld on request); Telephone Interview with Phil Dube, Assistant Pub. Defender; Los Angeles 
County Pub. Defender (November 17, 2009). In Marin County, community service is a commonly used alternative 
used by judges in place of fees and fines. Defendants can work off debt at $10/hour. Telephone Interview with Jose 
Varela, Assistant Pub. Defender; Law Offices of the Pub. Defender Marin County (Nov. 12, 2009). San Francisco 
offers community service only under limited circumstances.  Telephone Interview with Sangeeta Sinha, Deputy 
Pub. Defender, San Francisco Pub. Defender’s Office (Dec. 17, 2009).
76  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 938.30(2) (stating that a “judge may convert the statutory financial obligation into a court-
ordered obligation to perform community service after examining a person under oath and determining a person’s 
inability to pay”).
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77  See Ga. Code Ann., § 17-10-1(d) (stating that “in any case involving a misdemeanor or a felony in which the 
defendant has been punished in whole or in part by a fine, the sentencing judge shall be authorized to allow the 
defendant to satisfy such fine through community service” and proving that one hour of community service shall 
offset debt at the minimum wage rate unless otherwise specified by the sentencing judge). The text of this statute 
applies only to fines, and interviewees in Georgia indicated that community service did not apply to all financial 
obligations in their jurisdictions. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Robert Persse, Pub. Defender, Ogeechee 
Circuit Pub. Defender’s Office (Oct. 29, 2009) (stating he had never seen community service imposed in lieu of 
fees); Telephone Interview with Henry Goodman, Probation Officer (Oct. 29, 2009) (stating he had only seen 
community service imposed in lieu of fines and overdue probation supervision fees).
78  Generally Illinois law does not provide for community service in lieu of fees and fines, but community service is 
sometimes part of the sentence or is offered in lieu of non-mandatory drug assessment fines. Telephone Interview 
with Margaret Degen, Assistant Pub. Defender, Jackson County (Oct. 28, 2009).
79  Louisiana’s probation supervision fee statute provides that the court may require “the defendant to perform a specified 
amount of community service work each month if the court finds the defendant is unable to pay the supervision fee.” La. 
Code Crim. Proc. art. 895(D); see also art, 895.1(D). Although Louisiana law does not have a general provision explicitly 
providing for a community service alternative, judges do sometimes impose community service in practice. According to the 
Orleans Criminal Court Collections Department, judges may authorize community service in lieu of collecting fees and fines 
from indigent defendant, but do not do so regularly. Telephone Interview with Collections Dep’t, Orleans Criminal Court. 
(Aug. 11, 2009); Email from Rebecca Bers, Defender, Orleans Public Defender (Aug. 30, 2009, 19:59 EST) (on file with 
the Brennan Center). In Monroe County, defendants are assigned community service if they are unable to pay fees and fines. 
Telephone Interview with Bob Noel, Defender, Monroe County (Dec. 11, 2009).
80  Community service was used in the jurisdictions reviewed, although practices varied. For example, in Kent County, 
community service can be imposed for any financial obligation except mandatory fees and restitution. Community 
service is valued at $8/hour. Telephone Interview with Paula Taylor, Fin. Director, 17th Circuit Court (Kent County, 
Mich.) (Dec. 21, 2009). For felonies in Washtenaw county, a defendant can work off attorneys fees with community 
service, but not regular fines and costs. Telephone Interview with Sheila Blakney, Senior Assistant Pub. Defender, 
Washtenaw County Public Defender’s Office (Dec. 15, 2009).  
81  Several of the interviewees said that community service was not commonly used. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 
with Jaime Baker, Court Program Specialist, Scott County Circuit Clerk’s Office, in Benton, Mo. (Nov. 23, 2009). 
In one jurisdiction, judges will ordinarily waive fees and fines rather than impose community service. Telephone 
Interview with Dewayne Perry, Dist. Defender, Dist. 30 (Nov. 23, 2009). Some jurisdictions use community 
service for limited purposes, however. See, e.g., Email from Cathy Kelly, Deputy Dir., Director’s Office, Mo. Public 
Defender (Jan. 8, 2010, 13:46 CST) (on file with the Brennan Center) (stating that she has seen judges impose 
community service in lieu of fines when the defendant claims he or she does not have the money to pay a fine); 
Email from Donna Holden, Dist. Defender, Mo. Dist. 25 (Jan. 15, 2010, 08:30 CST) (on file with the Brennan 
Center) (stating that some Crawford County judges allow defendants to do community service toward jail board 
bills at a rate of $7-10/hr).
82 None of our interviewees indicated that community service was an available option in New York.
83  There is no provision for performing community service in lieu of paying fees or fines, and it does not appear that 
it occurs in practice. See, e.g.,Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, Assoc. Counsel, N.C. Admin. Office of the 
Courts (Nov. 20, 2009); Telephone Interview with Cynthia Buchanan, Head Cashier, Durham Clerk of Court 
(Nov. 19, 2009).
84  See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2951.02 (providing for payment of misdemeanor and felony fines through community 
service “if the offender requests an opportunity to satisfy the payment by this means and if the court determines that 
the offender is financially unable to pay the fine”); § 2929.28(B) (discussing community service to offset “financial 
sanction[s] and court costs”); § 2947.23(B) (discussing community services in cases where the defendant has failed 
to pay a judgment or to make timely payments under a payment plan). Community service is more common for 
misdemeanors than for felonies, and courts are generally more likely to give community service if the defendant has 
a reason for being unable to work, such as health problems. Telephone Interview with Miguel Santiago, Assistant 
State Pub. Defender (Nov. 23, 2009). Practices also vary across the state. For example, Greene County allows the 
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majority of people who ask to perform community service to do so, and is trying to expand the program. Telephone 
Interview with Barbara Cannon, Deputy Clerk, Greene County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 2, 2009). The community 
service option is less common in Summit County. Telephone Interview with Dan Horrigan, Summit County Clerk 
of Courts (Nov. 3, 2009).
85  In most jurisdictions, community service is uncommon as an alternative to fees/fines. See, e.g., Telephone Interview 
with Flo Messier, Pub. Defender of Phila. (Oct. 19, 2009); Telephone Interview, David Crowley, Chief Pub. Defender, 
Centre County (Oct. 23, 2009). However, Lycoming County allows community service to pay off fees (excluding 
restitution), if there is a court order to that effect. Defendants are paid at minimum wage. Telephone Interview 
with Nicole Spring, First Assistant Pub. Defendant, Lycoming County. (Oct. 26, 2009); Telephone Interview with 
Holly Raymin, Clerk, Lycoming County (Nov. 4, 2009). Similarly, Cambria county allows community service to 
pay off fees. It has created a “work force” for Cambria at 3-4 work locations run by a county supervisor. They work 
5 days a week, from 8am-3pm, for minimum wage. Telephone Interview with Lisa Lazzari, Pub. Defender, Cambria 
County. (Oct. 29, 2009).
86  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.09(f )-(g) (stating that “[a] court may require a defendant who is unable 
to pay a fine or costs to discharge all or part of the fine or costs by performing community service,” and must 
provide the number of hours the defendant must work and who will oversee related administrative tasks). In some 
jurisdictions, this option is offered at the time of sentencing, while in others, community service is offered only 
when the defendant falls behind in payment. See Telephone Interview with Amanda Marzulo and Andrea Marsh, 
Tex. Fair Defense Project (Oct. 14, 2009); Telephone Interview with Ted Wood, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Office of 
Court Admin.(Oct. 15, 2009).
87  See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-354(C) (providing that courts may allow a defendant on whom “a fine and costs have 
been imposed to discharge all or part of the fine or costs by earning credits for the performance of community 
service work before or after imprisonment”). The community service alternative is not used very regularly. When 
used, defendants’ obligations are credited at the minimum wage rate. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Gary 
Williams, Clerk, Sussex Circuit Court (Jan. 5, 2010); Telephone Interview with Diane Blackburn, Deputy Clerk, 
Buckingham Circuit Court (Dec. 28, 2009).
88  Email from Lisa Lazzari,Adm’r, Office of the Pub. Defender, Cambria County (Feb. 23, 2010, 12:41 EST) (on file 
with the Brennan Center).
89  Arizona: Criminal restitution orders accrue 10 percent interest per year. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-805(C), 44-
1201(A). Delinquencies collected through Arizona’s Fines, Fees and Restitution Enforcement (FARE) Program are 
subject to a flat fee of $35 and 19 percent surcharge. Telephone Interview with Tricia Ciancimono, Fin. Manager, 
Graham County Clerk of the Superior Court’s Office (Nov. 13, 2009). California: Civil assessment of up to $300 
for late payment of fine or related assessments. Cal. Penal Code § 1214.1(a); see also Telephone Interview with 
Jessica, Court Manager, L.A. Criminal Court (Oct. 29, 2009) (last name withheld on request). The Brennan 
Center confirmed that at least Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and San Francisco counties use this mechanism. See http://
www.lasuperiorcourt.org/criminal/; http://www.scselfservice.org/crim/payment.htm#fine; Telephone Interview 
with Sangeeta Sinha, Deputy Pub. Defender, S.F. Pub. Defender’s Office (Dec. 17, 2009). Florida: Highlands 
County charges a $20 late fee for every delinquent payment. Order Establishing a Collections Court Program in 
Highlands County (2003), http://www.jud10.org/AdministrativeOrders/orders/Section7/7-13.0.htm. Leon and 
Orange Counties charge a $10 surcharge for every delinquent payment. Leon County Court of Clerks Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.clerk.leon.fl.us/index.php?section=204&server=&page=clerk_services/faqs/index.
php&division=collections (last visited Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Payment FAQ]; Amended Administrative 
Order Governing a Collections Court Program in Orange County (2007), http://www.ninja9.org/adminorders/
orders/07-99-26-4%20-%20amended%20order%20governing%20collections%20court.pdf.  Georgia: The court 
can, in its discretion, require defendants to pay interest on restitution. Ga. Code Ann. § 17-14-14(d). However, 
it appears that in practice defendants are not charged late fees or interest for an outstanding balance. Telephine 
Interview with Claudia Saari, Defender, DeKalb County, Ga. (Oct. 23, 2009); Telephone Interview with Robert 
Persse, Defender, Ogeechee Circuit Pub. Defender’s Office (Oct.29, 2009); Telephone Interview with Peter Wilson, 
Fiscal Technician, Cobb County Clerk of Superior Court Office (Oct. 28, 2009); Telephone Interview with Henry 
Goodman, Prob. Officer, Gwinnett County (October 29, 2009). Illinois: A default in payment of a fine, fee, cost, 
restitution, or judgment of bond forfeiture draws interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum.  730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
5/5-9-3(e). Unless defendant is on a payment plan, the clerk may add to any judgment a “delinquency amount” 
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of 5 percent of the amount unpaid after thirty days, 10 percent of the amount unpaid after sixty days, and 15 
percent of the amount unpaid after ninety days. 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/124A-10. Louisiana: Interest is charged 
on unpaid fines, costs, and restitution beginning sixty days after the sentence is imposed. La. Code Crim. Proc. 
Ann. art. 886(A). Michigan: There is a 20 percent late fee after fifty-six days of delinquency. Mich. Comp.Laws § 
600.4803(1). Some jurisdictions charge this fee, while others do not. For example, the 17th Circuit Court in Kent 
County does not charge a late fee. Telephone Interview with Paula Taylor, Fin. Dir., 17th Circuit Court (Dec. 21, 
2009). Oakland and Washtenaw counties both charge the fee.  Telephone Interview with Judy Lockhart, Chief of 
Fiscal Servs., Oakland County Executive Office (Dec. 21, 2009); Telephone Interview with Sheila Blakney, Senior 
Assistant Pub. Defender, Washtenaw County Office of Pub. Defender (Dec. 15, 2009). Missouri: There is a $25 
one-time late fee. Telephone Interview with Jaime Baker, Court Program Specialist, Scott County Circuit Court 
Clerk’s Office (Nov. 23, 2009). Restitution can accrue 9 percent interest if entered as judgment on behalf of victims. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 408.040(1); Telephone Interview with Paul Fox, Dir. of Judicial Admin., St. Louis County Circuit 
Clerk’s Office (Nov. 30, 2009). North Carolina: $25 fee if fail to pay a fine, penalty, or costs within 20 days of date 
specified in judgment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-304(a)(6). Interest is generally not charged on outstanding balances, 
but if a civil judgment is entered against the defendant, a statutory interest rate of 8 percent  applies. Telephone 
Interview with Angie Colvard, Assistant Clerk, Ashe County Clerk’s Office (Nov. 19, 2009); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
24-1. If arrested as part of failure to pay, an additional $5 fee is imposed, plus a $5/day fee for every day defendant 
is held in jail. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-304(a)(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-313; Telephone Interview with Cynthia 
Buchanan, Head Cashier, Office of the Durham Clerk of Court (Nov. 19, 2009). Ohio: Some jurisdictions charge 
defendants a $25 late fee. Telephone Interview with Matt Davenport, Accounting/Finance Supervisor, Franklin 
County Municipal Clerk of Court (Nov. 25, 2009). Court clerks can collect “any interest due on the judgment 
for costs.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 2335.19(B). Pennsylvania:  Interest and late fees do not appear to be utilized in 
practice, but statute permits charging interest. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9728(a)(1); Telephone Interview with 
Nicole Spring, Defender, Lycoming County, Penn. (Oct. 26, 2009). Texas: $25 fee if a defendant pays any part of 
the fine, court costs, or restitution on or after the thirty-first day after the date on which judgment was entered, 
even if the defendant is on a payment plan. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 133.103(a); Telephone Interview with 
Ted Wood, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Tex. Office of Court Admin. (Oct. 15, 2009). Virginia: 6 percent interest may 
be ordered on fines, costs, and restitution, but interest on unpaid fines and costs does not accrue if the defendant 
is incarcerated or on a deferred or installment payment plan and makes timely payments. Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-
305.4, -353.5.
90  Cal. Penal Code § 1214.1(A). The Brennan Center confirmed that at least Los Angeles, Santa Clara, and San 
Francisco counties use this mechanism. See http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/criminal/; http://www.scselfservice.org/
crim/payment.htm#fine; Telephone Interview with Sangeeta Sinha, Deputy Public Defender, S.F. Pub. Defender’s 
Office (Dec. 17, 2009); Telephone Interview with Jessica, Court Manager, L.A. Criminal Court (Oct. 29, 2009) 
(last name withheld on request)
91  Leon  and Orange Counties charge a $10 surcharge.  Leon County Court of Clerks Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.clerk.leon.fl.us/index.php?section=204&server=&page=clerk_services/faqs/index.php&division=collections 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Payment FAQ]; Amended Administrative Order Governing a Collections 
Court Program in Orange County (2007), http://www.ninja9.org/adminorders/orders/07-99-26-4%20-%20
amended%20order%20governing%20collections%20court.pdf.
92  Highlands County charges a $20 late fee. Order Establishing a Collections Court Program in Highlands County 
(2003), http://www.jud10.org/AdministrativeOrders/orders/Section7/7-13.0.htm.
93  Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.4803(1).
94  Alabama: 30 percent fee if ninety days past due and transferred to district attorney for collection. Ala. Code § 12-
17-225.4; see also Telephone Interview with Veronica Harris, Macon County Circuit Court (Nov. 2, 2009).  Arizona: 
Courts may charge defendants for collection costs. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-116.03.  Maricopa County, which 
contains Phoenix, allows private collection agencies to collect an 18 percent surcharge on defendants.  Telephone 
Interview with Kim Knox, Supervisor, Maricopa County Dep’t of Finance  Collections Unit (Nov. 19, 2009). 
Florida: A private attorney or collections agent hired by the court clerk can add up to a 40 percent surcharge to 
the amounts it collects from delinquent payments.  Fla. Stat. § 28.246(6).  Illinois: For delinquent payments, 
an additional collection fee of 30 percent goes to the State’s Attorney in the relevant county to compensate for 
the costs of collection.  730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-9-3(e).  Missouri: If debts are sent to private debt collectors, 
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an additional 20 percent fee is collected.  Telephone Interview with Jaime Baker, Court Program Specialist, Scott 
County Circuit Court Clerk’s Office (Nov. 23, 2009).  North Carolina: Defendants not sentenced to supervised 
probation can be charged a “collection assistance fee” if an amount due is not paid for 30 days, which cannot 
exceed the average cost of collecting the debt or 20 percent, whichever is lower. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-321(b)(1). 
Ohio: Court clerk can charge defendants for collection fees charged by private debt collectors or public agencies 
involved in collection. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2335.19(b).  Practices vary.  For example, Dayton Municipal 
Court passes along the 30 percent fee charged by private debt collectors. Telephone Interview with Rita Orlowski, 
Central Payments Office Supervisor, Dayton Municipal Clerk of Court (Oct. 30, 2009).  Summit County does not 
charge defendants collection fees. Telephone Interview with Dan Horrigan, Summit County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 
3, 2009).  Pennsylvania: Practices vary.  Public defenders in several counties noted that private collection agencies 
are not utilized.  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Nicole Spring, Defender, Lycoming County (Oct. 26, 2009); 
Telephone Interview with Lisa Lazzari, Defender, Cambria County (Oct. 29, 2009); Telephone Interview with Art 
Ettinger, Defender, Alleghany County  (Oct. 29-30, 2009).  A Philadelphia public defender stated that private 
collection agencies sometimes impose an extra fee on defendants.  See Telephone Interview with Daniel Bartoli, 
Defender, Defender Ass’n of Phila. County (Oct. 27, 2009).  If such agencies are used, defendants can be charged 
a fee up to 25 percent of amount collected. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9730.1(b)(2). Texas: 30 percent collection 
fee is authorized for debts more than sixty days past due and referred to a private attorney or vendor, but not if the 
defendant has been found unable to pay the underlying debt   Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.0031(b), 
(d).  
95   Ala. Code § 12-17-225.4.
96  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 28.246(6). 
97  730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-9-3(e).
98  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.0031(d).
99 See supra note 65.
100  Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-354(A).  
101 Telephone Interview with Rebecca Bers, Orleans Pub. Defender (Dec. 2, 2009).
102  Fla. Stat. § 28.24(26)(b)-(c).  
103  Cal. Penal Code § 1214.1(a) (court may impose up to $300); see also Telephone Interview with Jessica, Court 
Manager, L.A. Criminal Court (Oct. 29, 2009) (last name withheld on request) ($300 charge issues if defendant 
fails to make payments).  
104  See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2010 tbl. 672 (2010), http://www.census.
gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/10s0672.pdf (stating that the average annual expenditures on food for consumer 
units with income less than $70,000 was $4,625 in 2007).  According to this data, one month’s expenditures would 
be $385.42. 
105  An informal Brennan Center survey found that Florida defendants faced an average debt of $772.23, such that a 40 
percent collection fee would be $308.89, bringing the defendant’s the total debt to $1,081.12.  Rebekah Diller, 
Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 
8 (2010).  
106  Ala. Code § 12-17-225.4.
107  Ala. Code § 8-8-1.
108 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668-69 (1983).
109  Jayne S. Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 37 
Rutgers L. J. 355, 359 (2006). 
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110  In 1869, England enacted the “1869 Act for the Abolition of Imprisonment for Debt.”  Certain forms of debtors’ 
prison continued even past that point.  Under the Act, courts retained the power to imprison people for willful 
failures to pay and between 1869 and 1914, courts imprisoned over 300,000 people for debt.  See Sandor E. Schick, 
Globalization, Bankruptcy, and the Myth of the Broken Bench, 80 Am. Bankr. L.J. 219, 258 & n.202 (2006).
111  Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding, and High-Cost Consumer Credit, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 807, 846 (2003) 
(describing Massachusetts, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania). 
112  Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 16 
(1995).
113  Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery By Another Name 63-69 (2008). 
114  Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970). 
115  Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983). Another Supreme Court case discussing the rights of the indigent is 
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (finding it unconstitutional to  “impos[e] a fine as a sentence and then 
automatically [convert] it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine 
in full”). 
116  See State v. Hotard, 17 So. 3d 64 (La. Ct. App. 2009). 
117 Some of these terms are adopted from Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
118  Alabama: See Ala. Code § 15-22-52 (courts may make fines or costs, or portions thereof, a condition of probation); 
Ala. Code § 15-18-70 (courts may make restitution a condition of probation). Arizona: See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. § 13-808(B) (courts are required to impose the payment of fines, fees, and restitution as a condition of 
probation). California: See Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4(m) (court must make the payment of restitution fines 
a condition of probation); Cal. Penal Code § 1203.1(j) (court may make fines a condition of probation, as 
well as “other reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be 
done”).  Florida: See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 27.52(1)(b)(1) (if a defendant does not pay the public defender application 
fee prior to the disposition of the case, the fee must be made part of the sentence or a condition of probation); 
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 948.09(6) (offenders under any type of supervision must submit to and pay for urinalysis 
as a condition of supervision); see also Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Hidden Costs of 
Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 4 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/FL_
Fees_report/ (many individuals convicted of misdemeanors and criminal traffic violations are sentenced to county 
or court probation on the condition that they pay legal financial obligations).  Georgia: See Telephone Interview 
with Claudia Saari, Defender, DeKalb County, Ga. (Oct. 23, 2009) (criminal justice debt imposed as a condition 
of probation); Telephone Interview with Robert Persse, Defender, Ogeechee Circuit Pub. Defender’s Office (Nov. 
6, 2009) (probation always imposed if there is a fine or other financial obligation imposed on defendant); see also 
Ga. Code Ann. § 17-14-3 (restitution shall be a condition of probation or a suspended, deferred, or withheld 
sentence); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-21A-6(c) (public defender application fee shall be imposed as a condition of 
probation if it has not been paid prior to sentencing).  Illinois: See 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-6-3(b) (court may 
require a person to pay a fine, costs, and restitution as a condition of probation).  Louisiana: See La. Code Crim. 
Proc. Ann. art. 895 (supervision fee must be a condition of probation); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 895.1 
(restitution must be a condition of probation, court may impose court costs and other user fees as a condition of 
probation).  Michigan: See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 769.1a(11) (restitution must be condition of probation, 
parole, or conditional sentence if ordered); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 769.1f(5) (prosecution costs must be 
condition of probation or parole if ordered); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 769.1j(3) (payment of the “minimum 
state cost” is a condition of probation );  Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(1)(f ) (mandatory assessment under 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 780.905 must be a condition of probation); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 771.3(2)(b)-
(d) (allowing courts to condition probation on payment of fines, legal expenses, and other assessments).  In practice 
many jurisdictions make fees and fines a condition of probation.  Missouri: See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 600.093 (allowing 
courts to make repayment of all or part of the value of public defender services a condition of probation); Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 559.021(2) (“In addition to such other authority as exists to order conditions of probation, the court 
may order such conditions as the court believes will serve to compensate the victim, any dependent of the victim, 
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any statutorily created fund for costs incurred as a result of the offender’s actions, or society.”).  New York: See N.Y. 
Crim. Proc. Law § 420.10(1)(c) (“Where the defendant is sentenced to a period of probation as well as a fine, 
restitution or reparation and such designated surcharge, the court may direct the payment of the fine, restitution or 
reparation and such designated surcharge be a condition of the sentence.”).  North Carolina: See N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 15A-1343(b) (as a regular condition of probation, defendant must pay a supervision fee, court costs, defender 
costs, any fine imposed, and restitution); N.C. Gen. Stat. 15A-1374(b)(c) (parole commission may require parolee 
to make restitution, pay a supervision fee, and comply with court orders regarding payment obligations). Ohio: 
See Telephone Interview with Glen Dewar, Defender, Montgomery County (Nov. 25, 2009) (criminal justice debt 
is normally made a condition of probation); Telephone Interview with Barbara Cannon, Deputy Clerk, Greene 
County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 2, 2009) (same).  Pennsylvania: See Telephone Interview with Flo Messier, Pub. 
Defender of Phila. (Oct. 19, 2009) (criminal justice debt is normally made a condition of probation); Telephone 
Interview with Lisa Lazzari, Pub. Defender, Cambria County. (Oct. 29, 2009) (same); see also 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 1106(b) (“Whenever restitution has been ordered . . . and the offender has been placed on probation or 
parole, his compliance with such order may be made a condition of such probation or parole.”).  Texas: See Tex. 
Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12 (payment of fines, court costs and other user fees, and restitution to the victim may 
be made a condition of community supervision, but must consider ability to pay); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 
42.037(h) (restitution must be a condition of community supervision, parole, or mandatory supervision).  Virginia: 
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-356 (court may make payment of fine and costs a condition of probation or suspension of 
sentence). 
119  See, e.g., Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews 
with public defenders and collection officials) (discussing frequent use of revocation hearings in jurisdictions in 
Georgia, New York, North Carolina, Michigan, and Ohio).
120  See Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews 
with public defenders and collection officials); see also Equal Justice Initiative, Criminal Justice Reform in 
Alabama: Sentencing, Probation, Prison Conditions, and Parole 69 (2005) (“[J]udges and inmates indicate 
that probation is often revoked for failure to pay fines, court fees and/or restitution, and sentences sometimes may 
exceed statutory limits.). 
121  See, e.g., Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing 
interviews with public defenders and collection officials) (saying revocation sometimes happens for failure to pay in 
jurisdictions in Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania).
122  See Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 
13 (Mar. 2010) (when an offender in Florida is unable to pay a treatment provider, “the treatment provider may 
eventually terminate the treatment as unsuccessful or the offender may cease showing up because he is unable to 
pay for sessions. Termination of treatment then can be a basis for a violation of probation or community release”) 
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/FL_Fees_report/.  
123  Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews with 
public defenders and collection officials) (discussing instances where courts did not consider ability to pay in 
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, and Missouri).
124  Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews with 
public defenders and collection officials).
125  Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews with 
public defenders and collection officials).
126  Telephone Interview with Sangeeta Sinha, Deputy Public Defender, S.F. Pub. Defender’s Office (Dec. 17, 2009); 
Telephone Interview with Gary Gibson, Defender, San Diego Pub. Defender (Dec. 2, 2009).
127  18 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 11.1101(e).
128  E-mail from Margaret Degen, Defender, Jackson County, to Brennan Center for Justice (Dec. 1, 2009, 17:35 EST) 
(on file with the Brennan Center).
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129 Telephone Interview with Angus Love, Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project (Mar. 17, 2010).
130  See Pew Ctr. on the States, 1 in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections, Fact Sheet on Pennsylvania 
(2009) (finding that Pennsylvania spends $97.72 per inmate per day), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.
org/report_detail.aspx?id=49382.
131  Alabama: See Ala. Code. § 15-18-62 (“In cases of willful nonpayment of the fines and costs, the defendant shall either be 
imprisoned in the county jail or, at the discretion of the court, sentenced to hard labor for the county . . . .”); Telephone 
Interview with Veronica Harris, Macon County Circuit Court (Dec. 8, 2009) (incarceration for failure to pay criminal 
justice debt is very common in Macon County).  Arizona: See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-810 (if a person sentenced to 
pay a fine, fee, costs, or restitution defaults, the clerk shall notify the prosecutor and sentencing court and the court shall 
require the defendant to show cause why the defendant’s default should not be treated as contempt); Telephone Interview 
with Tom O’Connell, Division Director, Probation Department, Maricopa County (Nov. 19, 2009) (Maricopa County 
uses contempt proceedings to enforce debt payments). California: See Cal. Penal Code § 1205(b) (“If time has been 
given for payment or it has been made payable in installments, the court shall, upon any default in payment, immediately 
order the arrest of the defendant and order him or her to show cause why he or she should not be imprisoned. If 
the fine, restitution order, or installment, is payable forthwith and it is not so paid, the court shall without further 
proceedings, immediately commit the defendant to the custody of the proper office to be held in custody until the fine 
or the installment thereof, as the case may be, is satisfied in full”).  Florida: See e.g. Fla. Stat. § 938.30(9) (“Any person 
failing to appear or willfully failing to comply with an order under this section, including an order to comply with a 
payment schedule established by the clerk of court, may be held in civil contempt.”) (emphasis added).  Defendants are 
not provided counsel. See Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal 
Justice Fees 17 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/FL_Fees_report/.  Illinois: 
730 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/5-9-3(a)(“An offender who defaults in the payment of a fine or any installment of that fine may 
be held in contempt and imprisoned for nonpayment.”); Telephone Interview with Margaret Degen, Defender, Jackson 
County (Oct. 28, 2009) (individuals are regularly held in contempt for failure to pay for 30 days); Telephone Interview 
with Lester Finkle, Defender, Cook County (Oct. 29, 2009) (same).  But see Marie Claire Tran-Leung, Sargent 
Shriver National Center on Poverty Law, Debt Arising From Illinois’ Criminal Justice System 39 (Nov. 2009) 
(finding that “imprisonment is not a typical enforcement tool”), available at http://www.theshriverbrief.org/2009/12/
articles/criminal-reentry/debt-arising-from-illinois-criminal-justice-system-making-sense-of-the-ad-hoc-accumulation-
of-financial-obligations/.  Louisiana: La. Rev. Stat. § 13:1381.2(A) (“When any defendant, other than an indigent, 
fails to pay [certain criminal justice debt], he shall be sentenced to a term of thirty days in the parish prison in default of 
the payment of same.”); La. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 884-85 (a sentence that includes fines or costs shall provide that 
if individuals default they will be incarcerated for a specified term, but can be released if they pay their debt). See also 
Telephone Interview with Rebecca Bers, Orleans Public Defender (Aug. 5, 2009) (individuals face potential incarceration 
for failures to pay).  Michigan: See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Paula Taylor, Fin. Dir., 17th Circuit Court, Kent 
County (Dec. 21, 2009) (contempt proceedings used to collect debt; individuals can be incarcerated up to 45 days unless 
they pay off their debts, but in practice the sentence is usually 3-4 days); Phone Interview, Sheila Blakney, Senior Assistant 
Public Defender, Washtenaw County Public Defender’s Office (December 15, 2009) (contempt proceedings used in 
Washtenaw County).  New York: See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law. § 420.10(3) (sentence may provide that if a defendant 
fails to pay a fine, restitution, or reparation, he or she must be imprisoned until the debt is satisfied).  North Carolina: 
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1364(b) (following a show-cause proceeding for non-payment, the court may activate a 
defendant’s suspended sentence or if no suspended sentence was imposed, order imprisonment for not more than 30 
days, and may provide that payment will result in release or a reduction in the jail term); Telephone Interview with Matt 
Osborne, Assoc. Counsel, N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts (Nov. 20, 2009) (defendants can be subject to incarceration 
for willful nonpayment through contempt proceedings); Telephone Interview with Emily Harrell, Defender, Buncombe 
County (Nov. 20, 2009) (contempt not common in her county, but in other counties contempt proceedings are used 
as an additional “stick” as part of the probation supervision process, imposing periods of incarceration on top of what a 
defendant is subject to through probation).  Ohio: See Ohio Rev. Code § 2947.14(A) (“If a fine is imposed as a sentence 
or a part of a sentence, the court or magistrate that imposed the fine may order that the offender be committed to the 
jail or workhouse until the fine is paid or secured to be paid, or the offender is otherwise legally discharged, if the court 
or magistrate determines at a hearing that the offender is able, at that time, to pay the fine but refuses to do so.”); E-mail 
from Miguel Santiago, Defender (Oct. 16, 2009) (courts frequently incarcerate defendants not only for failures to pay 
fines but for failure to pay costs, even though there is no statutory authorization to do so).  Texas: See Tex. Code. Crim. 
Proc. art. 43.03(a) (if a defendant defaults on paying fines or costs, the court may order the defendant confined in jail 
until discharged as provided by law). 
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132  See Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 15 
17 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/FL_Fees_report/.
133  Andrews v. Walton, 428 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1983). 
134 Adkins v. Adkins, 248 S.E.2d 646 (Ga. 1978). 
135  In re Calhoun, 350 N.E.2d 665 (Ohio 1976).  Some appellate courts in Ohio have treated Calhoun as overruled by 
Lassiter, while others have continued to follow the case’s holding.  See Garfield Hts. v. Stefaniuk, 712 N.E.2d 808, 
809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (“There is a conflict in the appellate decisions concerning whether a contemnor in a civil 
contempt proceeding is entitled to appointed counsel.”). 
136  Lower courts in Pennsylvania and Virginia have likewise rejected the right to counsel in civil proceedings involving 
incarceration, while courts in Alabama, Arizona, and Louisiana appear to have never considered the question.  See 
Wade v. Daniels, No. 008610210, 1997 WL 1433799 (Ct. Com. Pl. Phila. County, Nov. 21, 1997), appeal dismissed 
718 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (mem.); Krieger v. Commonwealth, 567 S.E.2d 557 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).  But 
see Another court of common pleas disagreed; however, the decision was quashed.  See Carnes v. Carnes, No. NS 81 
9044, 1990 WL 302942 (Ct. Com. Pl. Erie County, Oct. 23, 1990) (indigent defendant is entitled to court-appointed 
counsel for civil support contempt proceedings), quashed 598 A.2d 1325 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (mem.). 
137  See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 553 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 1977) (concluding that a person charged 
with civil or criminal contempt is entitled to appointed counsel and noting that three Circuit Courts of Appeals 
had previously come to the same conclusion); McBride v. McBride, 431 S.E.2d 14, 18 (N.C. 1993) (indigent civil 
contemnors may not be incarcerated for failure to pay child support arrearages); Mead v. Batchlor, 460 N.W.2d 493, 
504-05 (Mich. 1990) (holding that a defendant may not be imprisoned for civil contempt if denied counsel during 
the contempt proceeding). 
138  In California, defendants can choose to sit out fines at a daily rate set by the county, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code 
§ 1205(a). See also Telephone Interview with Gary Gibson, Defender, San Diego Pub. Defender (Dec. 2, 2009) (jail 
option used in San Diego County); Telephone Interview with Jose Valera, Defender, Marin County (Nov. 11, 2009) 
(jail option used in Marin County); Telephone Interview with Phil Dube, Assistant Pub. Defender, L.A. County 
Pub. Defender (Nov. 17, 2009) (jail option used in Los Angeles County, which has set the rate at the statutory 
minimum of $30/day).  But see Telephone Interview with Sangeeta Sinha, Defender, San Francisco Pub. Defender 
(Dec. 17, 2009) (not used in San Francisco).
139  See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 543.270(1) (circuit judge has the power, at the request of a defendant, to commute fine and 
costs to imprisonment in the county jail, which is credited at $10 per day); see also Email from Kari Cornstock, 
District Defender, District 26 (forwarded by Cathy Kelly on Jan. 14, 2010) (jail option used in Morgan County); 
Email from Justin Carver, District Defender, District 12 (forwarded by Cathy Kelly on Jan. 14, 2010) (jail option 
used in Callaway County).
140  Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews with 
public defenders and collection officials).  
141  Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971).
142 Telephone Interview with Jose Valera, Defender, Marin County (Nov. 11, 2009).
143  See E-mail from Richard Scheibe, Defender, Dist. 11 (Jan. 14, 2010) (forwarded by Cathy Kelly on Jan. 14, 
2010).  
144  Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews with 
public defenders and collection officials).  
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145  Alabama: See Telephone Interview with Veronica Harris, Macon County Circuit Court (Dec. 8, 2009) (arrest 
warrants issue both for the failure to appear at debt-related show cause hearings for the failure to pay when 
individuals are on probation).  But see Telephone Interview with Robert Oakes, Assistant Exec. Dir., Ala. Bd. 
of Pardons and Parole (Nov. 2, 2009) (arrests for non-payment do not happen often in practice).  Arizona: See 
Telephone Interview with Jessica Alonso, Collections Officer, Prob. Dep’t, Greenlee County (Nov. 11, 2009) 
(if a person is 60-90 days behind on payments, the probation officer will usually have the person arrested and 
brought before the court on the threat of probation revocation, although actual revocation is very rare); Telephone 
Interview with Dusty Alder, Senior Deputy Probation Officer, Mojave County (Nov. 18, 2009) (individuals who 
miss payments are required to fulfill alternative requirements, such as attending a budget training, and failure to 
fulfill these requirements can lead to arrest for probation violation). California: See Telephone Interview with Phil 
Dube, Assistant Pub. Defender, L.A. County Pub. Defender (Nov. 17, 2009). (individuals face arrest for failing 
to appear at a scheduled check-in meeting regarding their criminal justice debt); Superior Court of California, 
General Information, http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/criminal/ (noting that, in Los Angeles County, “[i]f you fail 
to pay a fine as promised/ordered, the Court may order and issue a warrant for your arrest.”); Telephone Interview 
with Jessica, Court Manager, L.A. Criminal Court (Oct. 29, 2009) (last name withheld on request) (confirming 
that arrest warrants are used for failures to pay fines but noting that warrants are rarely used in the case of fees); 
Payment of Fines, Santa Clara County Superior Court, http://www.scselfservice.org/crim/payment.htm (“If you 
don’t pay your fine on time, the Court can put out a warrant for your arrest or proceed by Civil Assessment.  If you 
need more time to pay, contact the Department of Revenue.”).  Florida: See Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for 
Justice, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 15, 20 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.
brennancenter.org/content/resource/FL_Fees_report/ (finding that in counties with collections courts, a failure to 
appear for a payment hearing will typically result in an arrest warrant being issued, and that in Alachua County, 
in some circumstances arrest warrants issue automatically for failures to pay).  Georgia: See Telephone Interview 
with Nick White, Defender, Houston County Pub. Defender Office (Nov. 6, 2009) (individuals who cannot pay 
criminal justice debt are often arrested for failing to report to probation officers, who are involved in collection). 
Illinois: See Telephone Interview with Margaret Degen, Assistant Pub. Defender, Jackson County (Oct. 29, 2009) 
(failure to appear at a payment hearing can result in an arrest warrant being issued).  Louisiana: See infra notes 
158-159 and accompanying text (discussing data on arrest warrants in New Orleans).  Michigan: See Telephone 
Interview with Paula Taylor, Fin. Dir., 17th Circuit Court, Kent County, Mich. (Dec. 21, 2009) (if a defendant 
fails to comply with the payment plan set up at a show cause hearing (which was the result of previous failure to 
pay), a bench warrant issues); Telephone Interview with Sheila Blakney, Senior Assistant Pub. Defender, Washtenaw 
County Pub. Defender’s Office (Dec. 15, 2009) (individuals are arrested if they fall behind on payments and fail to 
appear at a show-cause hearing).  Missouri: Email, Cathy Kelly, Deputy Director, Director’s Office, Missouri Public 
Defender, St. Louis (Jan. 14, 2010) (individuals can be arrested and held in jail for a night for a failure to pay costs). 
New York: See Telephone Interview with Jay L. Wilber, Defender, Broome County (Dec. 1, 2009) (arrests warrants 
are issued for failure to pay and failure to pay can sometimes result in jail time).  North Carolina: See Telephone 
Interview with Jennifer Harjo, Defender, New Hanover County (Nov. 24, 2009) (warrants are issued for failures to 
appear at a show cause hearing). Ohio: See Telephone Interview with Miguel Santiago, Defender (Nov. 23, 2009) 
(practices vary across counties, but in general, it is common for people to be arrested for failing to pay fines and 
costs); Telephone Interview with Glen Dewar, Defender, Montgomery County (Nov. 25, 2009) (arrest warrants 
issue for failures to appear at payment hearings).  Pennsylvania: See E-mail from David Crowley, Defender, Centre 
County, Pa. (Nov. 30, 2009) (Magisterial District Courts automatically issue arrest warrants for missed payments if 
a person is 31 days delinquent); E-mail from Nicole Spring, Defender, Lycoming County, Pa. (Dec. 1, 2009) (bench 
warrants are issued for failure to appear at a payment hearing). Texas: See Carl Reynolds et al., Council of 
State Gov’ts Justice Ctr., A Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Restitution, and Child Support are 
Assessed and Collection from People Convicted of Crimes 82 (2009), available at http://www.courts.state.
tx.us/oca/debts/pdf/TexasFinancialObligationsInterimReport.pdf (a “capias pro fine” may be issued for a person’s 
arrest if he or she fails to pay criminal justice debt, and in Collection Improvement Program districts, arrests are 
sometimes used in misdemeanor cases but seldom used in cases where an individual is on parole).  Virginia: See 
Telephone Interview with Renee Howard, Deputy Clerk, Lee Circuit Court, Virginia (Jan. 5 2010) (A defendant is 
sent a notice to appear at a show cause hearing for failure to pay, and a capias arrest warrant issues if the defendant 
fails to appear).
146  See, e.g., E-mail from David Crowley, Defender, Centre County, Pa. (Nov. 30, 2009) (Magisterial District Courts 
automatically issue arrest warrants for missed payments if a person is 31 days delinquent).
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147  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Jessica Alonso, Collections Officer, Prob. Dep’t, Greenlee County, Ariz. (Nov. 
11, 2009) (if a person is 60-90 days behind on payments, the probation officer will usually have the person arrested 
and brought before the court on the threat of probation revocation, although actual revocation is very rare).
148  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Sheila Blakney, Senior Assistant Pub. Defender, Washtenaw County Pub. 
Defender’s Office, Mich. (Dec. 15, 2009) (individuals are arrested if they fall behind on payments and fail to appear 
at a show-cause hearing).
149  See Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s 
Criminal Justice Fees 15-17 (2010).
150  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Jennifer Harjo, Defender, New Hanover County, North Carolina (Nov. 24, 
2009) (in her county, bond amounts are frequently higher than what the defendant owes); Rebekah Diller, 
Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 
16 (2010) (“purge” amounts are not linked to ability to pay, requiring family, friends, or employers to often put up 
the required money).
151  Brennan Center Memorandum (Sept. 15, 2010) (on file with the Brennan Center) (summarizing interviews with 
public defenders and collection officials).  
152  These statistics reflects a review of eight days of dockets (December 1-4 and December 7-10, 2009) for the twelve 
sections that make up New Orleans’ felony courtrooms.  The Brennan Center calculated the percentage of cases that 
involved payment issues, as well as the percentage of payment issue cases that involved arrest warrants.  Payment 
issues included appearances categorized as “Filed Arrest on Cap[ias] Notification” (where the docket reflected the 
capias warrant was issued for a failure to pay fees and fines or appear at a status on payment hearing),  “Status on 
Payment,” “Restitution Hearings,” and “Payment of Restitution Hearings.”  The Brennan Center did not count 
cases listed as “contempt of court hrg”, “probation status” and “hrg and resentencing,” even though these may be 
about fees as well.  For further details on methodology, see Memorandum, New Orleans Data Methodology (on file 
with the Brennan Center).  
153  In response to a willful failure to pay a fine, the magistrate or clerk of the court may give notice of the fact to 
the [Department of Motor Vehicles] for a violation.” Cal. Veh. Code 40509.5(b). In response, the DMV will 
sometimes suspend licenses. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Sally Pina, Clerk, San Francisco Collections Unit 
(Dec. 20, 2009) (DMV sometimes suspends licenses upon notification);Telephone Interview with Randy Dickow, 
KCBA Indigent Defense Program, Bakersfield, California (Nov. 12, 2009) (DMV suspends licenses in driving-
related cases). 
154  This is a very common enforcement mechanism in Florida.  Office of Program Policy Analysis and Gov’t 
Accountability, Florida Legislature,,Clerks of Court Generally Are Meeting the System’s Collection 
Performance Standards 4 (2007), available at http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0721rpt.pdf (85 percent 
of county clerks use “Driver’s License Sanctions” as a collection tool). See also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 322.245(3-5) 
(authorizing the clerk of courts to notify the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles if “a person licensed to operate 
a motor vehicle in [Florida] . . . has failed to pay financial obligations for any criminal offense other than [certain 
traffic misdemeanors and traffic felonies]” and requiring the DMV to suspend the person’s driver’s license upon 
receipt of such notification). 
155  See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 885.1 (courts may order defendants with outstanding fines to surrender their 
driver’s licenses, ultimately leading to a suspended license). 
156  If the Secretary of State finds that a defendant is in default or has a warrant issued for certain motor vehicle code 
violations, it can trigger a suspension of the defendant’s license.  This is not ordered by the court, but is rather 
through the Secretary of State.   The suspension is lifted if the defendant pays plus an additional clearance fee and 
a reinstatement fee.  Mich. Comp. Laws 257.321c.
157  Generally not, but for motor vehicle offenses, after a period of default the court will report a failure to pay to the 
DMV, which will suspend a defendant’s license until he or she pays.  Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, 
Associate Counsel, North Carolina Admin. Office of the Courts (Nov. 20, 2009); Telephone Interview with Cynthia 
Buchanan, Head Cashier, Durham Clerk of Court (Nov. 19, 2009).
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158  For individuals convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, full fees and fines must be paid 
before a suspended license can be reinstated.  Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1541(d).  At least one jurisdiction suspends 
driver’s licenses.  Telephone Interview with Holly Raymin, Clerk, Lycoming County, Pennsylvania (Nov. 4, 2009) 
(collections division has used authority to suspend driver’s licenses). 
159  Individuals may be denied their driver’s license renewals for a failure to pay or satisfy court judgments in any court 
with criminal jurisdiction.  Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 706.002; Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 706.004(a); Tex. Op. 
Att’y Gen. GA-0479 (2006).  Generally, courts will only exercise this power in the case of defendants convicted of 
Class C misdemeanors, rather than more serious crimes.  Justice Center, Council of State Governments, A 
Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Restitution, and Child Support are Assessed and Collected 
from People Convicted of Crimes at 81.  License suspension is one of a number of powers utilized as part of the 
state’s Comprehensive Collections Program.  See Office of Court Administration, Collection Improvement 
Program 1 (2010), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/collections/collections.asp.    
160  Under Va. Stat  Ann. § 46.2-395(B), if a defendant fails to make payments on any fine, costs, forfeiture, restitution, 
or penalty, the court must suspend the defendant’s driver’s license until the amounts due are paid in full or the 
defendant enters into a new payment plan. A number of Virginia jurisdictions participate in this program. See, 
e.g., Telephone Interview with Laura Rodgers, Deputy Clerk, Halifax Circuit Court, Virginia (January 5, 2010); 
Telephone Interview with Diane Blackburn, Deputy Clerk.  
161  See, e.g. Alabama: Telephone Interview with Veronica Harris, Clerk of Court, Macon County Circuit Court (Nov. 
2, 2009) (Macon County suspends driver’s licenses for a failure to appear.); California: A comprehensive collection 
program for recovering delinquent fees and fines payments may include a driver’s license revocation element where 
appropriate. Cal. Penal Code § 1463.007(m); Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 302.341(1); Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 4507.091 describes the use of warrant blocks.  A court, at its discretion, “may order the clerk of the court 
to send to the registrar of motor vehicles a report containing the name, address, and such other information as 
the registrar may require by rule, of any person for whom an arrest warrant has been issued by that court and is 
outstanding.”  Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4507.091(A). The information is entered into the BMV’s records.  Id.  The 
warrant block prevents the person from obtaining a certificate of registration for a vehicle or obtaining or renewing 
a driver’s license. Id. When all outstanding arrest warrants have been satisfied, the defendant must pay the BMV 
$15 to lift the warrant block. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4507.091(B).
162  Cal. Veh. Code § 14601(b)(1). 
163  Cal. Veh. Code § 14601.3(d)(1).
164  Telephone Interview with Sangeeta Sinha, Defender, San Francisco Public Defender’s Office (Dec. 17, 2009).
165 Probation can be extended for up to five years for nonpayment.  At the end of the five years the defendant is rolled 
 off probation even if he has not paid.  In split sentence cases there is no automatic roll-off after five years.  Telephone 
 Interview with Robert Oakes, Assistant Executive Director, Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles (Nov. 2, 2009). 
 The practice here is particularly bad because the DA can still bring contempt proceedings after probation or parole 
 has ended.  Id. 
166  Probation can be extended beyond the expiration or termination of probation if the defendant still owes restitution. 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(c).  This is standard practice.  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Tom O’Connell, 
Division Director, Probation Department, Maricopa County, Arizona (Nov. 19, 2009); Telephone Interview with 
Jessica Alonso, Collections Officer, Probation Department, Greenlee County, Arizona (Nov. 13, 2009) (probation 
is generally extended when restitution is owed; if the probationary period has already ended, financial obligations 
are more likely to be converted into a civil judgment).. Probation can be extended up to five years for a felony and 
two years for a misdemeanor.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902(c). 
167  People v. Medeiros, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1260, 1267 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (if a defendant cannot pay fees and fines, 
the court can extend probation to the maximum time permitted by law but not beyond that and must discharge 
probation); People v. Sisco, No. E037254, 2005 WL 3473325, at *9 (Cal. App. 4th Dec. 20, 2005) (a defendant 
can also consent to extend probation). In Marin County, defendants agree to extensions because otherwise their 
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record would reflect that probation was unsuccessfully terminated. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Jose Varela, 
Defender, Marin County, California (Nov. 12, 2009). This is problematic for defendants because the other terms of 
probation are extended as well and the extension is usually for five years.  Further when a defendant is on probation 
and has an infraction the punishment is harsher. Telephone Interview with Sangeeta Sinha, Defender, San Francisco 
Public Defender’s Office (Dec. 17, 2009). But see, e.g., Telephone Interview with Randy Dickow, Administrator, 
KCBA Indigent Defense Program, Bakersfield, California (Nov. 13, 2009) (California mandates a hearing prior to 
probation term extension; in light of the hearing requirement, which may dissuade the state from pursuing this 
course of action, defendants often do not give their consent for extensions); Telephone Interview with Sally Pina, 
Clerk, Superior Court of California, San Francisco County (Dec. 20, 2009) (probation is usually extended only for 
restitution but the Collections Unit continues to pursue fees and fines from the defendant after the termination of 
probation).  
168  See Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of Florida’s 
Criminal Justice Fees 24 (2010) (when monthly payment plan is set by Florida Department of Corrections, a 
probation violation for failure to pay can only occur at the end of the probation term, at which point the judge can 
extend the supervision period for a willful failure to pay). 
169  Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-1(a)(2) (“Probation supervision shall terminate in all cases no later than two years from 
the commencement of probation supervision unless specially extended or reinstated by the sentencing court upon 
notice and hearing and for good cause shown; provided, however, in those cases involving the collection of fines, 
restitution, or other funds, the period of supervision shall remain in effect for so long as any such obligation is 
outstanding, or until termination of the sentence, whichever first occurs”).  The court generally cannot extend 
a defendant’s total sentence, however. Telephone Interview with Claudia Saari, Interim Circuit Public Defender, 
DeKalb County, Georgia (Oct. 23, 2009); Telephone Interview with Robert Persse, Defender, Ogeechee Circuit 
Public Defender’s Office (Oct. 29, 2009).
170  La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art  894.4 (“When a defendant has been sentenced to probation or is on parole and 
has a monetary obligation, including but not limited to court costs, fines, costs of prosecution, and any other 
monetary costs associated with probation or parole, the judge may extend the period of probation or parole until 
the monetary obligation is extinguished”). 
171  Telephone Interview with Sheila Blakney, Defender, Washtenaw County Public Defender’s Office (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(when probation is coming to an end and the defendant still owes money the judge will often extend probation to 
the maximum period allowed by law to give the defendant more time to pay);  Telephone Interview with Donald 
Johnson, Chief Defender, State Defender Office (Dec. 10, 2009) (sometimes a defendant will have probation 
extended if the defendant can’t pay by the end of the term, thus has never seen an extension for more than a year).
172  Telephone Interview with Dewayne Perry, Defender, State Public Defender (Nov. 23, 2009) (probation can be 
extended up to a year beyond the statutory maximum as a result of failure to pay costs but this happens only if the 
defender has the capacity to pay); Telephone Interview with Jaime Baker, Court Program Specialist, Scott County 
Circuit Clerk’s Office (Nov. 23, 2009); see also Mo. Rev. Stat. § 559.105(2) (“No person ordered by the court to 
pay restitution pursuant to this section shall be released from probation until such restitution is complete. If full 
restitution is not made within the original term of probation, the court shall order the maximum term of probation 
allowed for such offense.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 599.105(3) (applying similar provisions to parole).  
173  Telephone Interview with Emily Harrell, Defender, Buncombe County, North Carolina (Nov. 20, 2009) (judges 
typically extend a defendant’s probation term at hearings on probation violations for failure to pay).  
174  Under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.15(B) and Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.25(C)(2), if a person violates the 
conditions of community control, the court can extend the period of community control, impose a more restrictive 
community control sanction, or impose a prison or jail term, provided, the total duration of community control 
does not exceed five years.  Payment of fees and fines is considered a condition of community control.  See State v. 
Carpenter, No. 2008 CA 00238, 2009 WL 2894603 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2009).  Therefore, a person’s term 
of community control can be extended if he or she fails to pay.  Before the term can be extended, however, the 
defendant is entitled to notice and a hearing.  State v. Fairbank, No. WD-06-015, No. WD-06-016, 2006 WL 
3378338 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2006); State v. Flekel, No. 80337, No. 80338, 2002 WL 1307430 at *3 
(Ohio Ct. App. June 13, 2002).
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175  In practice some counties do extend probation, often to correspond with an extended payment plan set based on 
defendant’s ability to pay.  Telephone Interview with David Crowley, Defender, Centre County, Pennsylvania (Oct. 
23, 2009); Telephone Interview with Nicole Spring, Defender, Lycoming County, Pennsylvania (Oct. 26, 2009). 
In Allegheny County, courts may extend probation terms for failure to pay restitution.  Telephone Interview with 
Art Ettinger, Defender, Alleghany County, Philadelphia (Oct.29, 2009).  Courts often limit the length of probation 
terms. For a first misdemeanor, for example, courts impose a maximum of 5 years. Telephone Interview with Daniel 
Bartoli, Defender, Defender Association of Philadelphia County (Oct. 27, 2009).
176  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12(22)(c) (“The judge may extend a period of community supervision on a 
showing of good cause under this section as often as the judge determines is necessary, but the period of community 
supervision in a first, second, or third degree felony case may not exceed 10 years and, except as otherwise provided 
by this subsection, the period of community supervision in a misdemeanor case may not exceed three years.  The 
judge may extend the period of community supervision in a misdemeanor case for any period the judge determines is 
necessary, not to exceed an additional two years beyond the three-year limit, if the defendant fails to pay a previously assessed 
fine, costs, or restitution and the judge determines that extending the period of supervision increases the likelihood that the 
defendant will fully pay the fine, costs, or restitution.  A court may extend a period of community supervision under 
this section at any time during the period of supervision or, if a motion for revocation of community supervision is 
filed before the period of supervision ends, before the first anniversary of the date on which the period of supervision 
expires”) (emphasis added); Justice Ctr., Council of State Gov’ts, A Framework to Improve How Fines, 
Fees, Restitution, and Child Support are Assessed and Collected from People Convicted of Crimes70 
n.50 (2009), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/debts/pdf/TexasFinancialObligationsInterimReport.pdf 
(Good cause is generally interpreted to include failure to pay fees and fines in felony cases).
177  Pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-305(C), “No defendant shall be kept under supervised probation solely because 
of his failure to make full payment of fines, fees, or costs, provided that, following notice by the probation and 
parole officer to each court and attorney for the Commonwealth in whose jurisdiction any fines, fees, or costs are 
owed by the defendant, no such court or attorney for the Commonwealth objects to his removal from supervised 
probation.”  However, this statute does not apply to restitution. Id.  Some clerks interviewed for this report stated 
that they believed probation is extended even when restitution is not involved.  See Telephone Interview with Kerry 
Rohr, Clerk, Bristol Circuit Court, (Dec. 28, 2009); Telephone Interview with Renee Howard, Deputy Clerk, Lee 
Circuit Court (Jan. 5, 2010).
178  See Pew Ctr. on the States, 1 in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections, Fact Sheet on California 
(2009) (finding that California spends $134.83 per inmate per day), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.
org/report_detail.aspx?id=49382.
179  Randal C. Archibold, California, in Financial Crisis, Opens Prison Doors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2010, at A14.. 
180  Tony Burbeck, 12 Mecklenburg Libraries to Close in Two Weeks, WCNC.com, Mar. 18, 2010, http://www.wcnc.
com/news/local/County-debates-which-libraries-to-close-88418652.html. 
181  Telephone Interview with Mohammed Kemokai, Fine Collection Lead Coordinator, 26th Judicial District (Jan. 12, 
2010).  
182  See Mecklenburg County Fine Collection Status Report, Dec. 2009 (Jan. 13, 2010) (on file with the Brennan 
Center); see also Telephone Interview with Mohammed Kemokai, Fine Collection Lead Coordinator, 26th Judicial 
District (Jan. 12, 2010).  This figure does not include individuals who failed to appear at payment hearings.  An 
additional 63 individuals failed to appear at payment hearings and had warrants automatically issued for their 
arrest.
183  See Telephone Interview with Tony Purcell, Assistant Public Defender, Mecklenburg County (Jan. 19, 2010) 
(stating that judges often remit the debts of individuals who were held in jail pending a hearing).
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184  This calculation is based on a daily jail cost of $40, the current reimbursement rate paid by the North Carolina 
Department of Corrections to county jails.  See North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts, Court Costs 
and Fee Chart (Sept. 2009), http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/Trial/Documents/court_costs_chart-2009-criminal.
pdf.  According to Mecklenburg County Fine Collection Department data, arrested individuals were collectively 
held for a total of 1022 days pending a court appearance.
185  See Mecklenburg County Fine Collection Status Report, Dec. 2009 (Jan. 13, 2010) (on file with the Brennan 
Center); see also Telephone Interview with Mohammed Kemokai, Fine Collection Lead Coordinator, 26th Judicial 
District (Jan. 12, 2010).
186  An additional 63 individuals failed to appear at payment hearings and had warrants automatically issued for their 
arrest.  See Mecklenburg County Fine Collection Status Report, Dec. 2009 (Jan. 13, 2010) (on file with the 
Brennan Center); see also Telephone Interview with Mohammed Kemokai, Fine Collection Lead Coordinator, 26th 
Judicial District (Jan. 12, 2010).  
187  Arizona: If probation is not ordered, or if probation is ordered but has expired and fees, fines, or restitution remain 
to be paid, the court may issue a criminal restitution order.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-805(A).  The criminal restitution 
order functions as and may be enforced just like any civil judgment, except that it does not expire and it imposes 
10 percent interest per year.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-805(C) and 44-1201; see also Telephone Interview with Kim 
Knox, Supervisor, Maricopa County Dep’t of Fin.  Collections Unit (Nov. 19, 2009).  California: Many fees and 
fines can be enforced “in the same manner as on a judgment in a civil action.”  See Cal. Gov’t Code § 27712 (cost 
of legal assistance); Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4(a)(3)(B) (restitution).  Practices vary.  In San Diego, fees and fines 
are converted to civil judgment if at the end of a probation term, there is a balance due. Telephone Interview with 
Gary Gibson, Defender, San Diego County Pub. Defender (Dec. 2, 2009).  In Los Angeles, some debts are also 
enforced through civil judgments.  Telephone Interview with Phil Dube, Defender, L.A. County Pub. Defender 
(Nov. 17, 2009).  Florida: Fla. Stat. § 938.30(6) (“If judgment has not been previously entered on any court-
imposed financial obligation, the court may enter judgment thereon and issue any writ necessary to enforce the 
judgment in the manner allowed in civil cases.”); § 960.294(2) (“A civil restitution lien order may be enforced . . . 
in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action . . . .”).  Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-20(a) (“In any case in 
which a fine or restitution is imposed as part of the sentence, such fine and restitution shall constitute a judgment 
against the defendant.”).  Illinois: 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/124A-10 (“The property, real and personal, of a person 
who is convicted of an offense shall be bound, and a lien is created on the property, both real and personal, of every 
offender, not exempt from the enforcement of a judgment or attachment, from the time of finding the indictment 
at least so far as will be sufficient to pay the fine and costs of prosecution.”).  Louisiana: The court can convert legal 
fees, fines, and restitution (and interest) into a judgment, which can be enforced in the same manner as a money 
judgment in a civil case.  See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 886(A), 895.1.  Michigan: Penalties, fees, or costs 
not incurred as a result of a misdemeanor “may be recovered in the same manner as civil judgments . . . .”  Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 600.4805; see also § 769.1f(6) (“An order for reimbursement [for prosecution costs] under this 
section may be enforced . . . in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action.”).  New York: N.Y. Crim. Proc. 
Law § 420.10(6)(a) (“A fine, restitution or reparation imposed or directed by the court . . . shall be entered by the 
county clerk in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action . . . .”); § 420.35(1) (stating that the provisions of 
§ 420.10 are applicable to specified fees, including certain mandatory surcharges, the sex offender registration fee, 
the DNA databank fee and the crime victim assistance fee); § 420.40(5) (“The order shall direct that any unpaid 
balance of the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee may be collected in the 
same manner as a civil judgment.”).  North Carolina: Restitution in excess of $250 is docketed in the same manner 
as a civil judgment and may be collected in the same manner, with certain exceptions for restitution as a condition 
of probation. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1340.38(a)-(b).  Public defender costs are also entered as judgments and 
constitute a lien. § 7A-455(b).  Upon a defendant’s default in paying fines or costs, the court may order the 
judgment be docketed, becoming a lien on real estate in the same manner as do judgments in civil actions.  § 15A-
1365.  Texas: Restitution may be collected as a civil judgment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037(m) 
(“An order of restitution may be enforced by the state or a victim named in the order to receive the restitution in the 
same manner as a judgment in a civil action.”).  Virginia: Fines imposed and costs taxed in a criminal prosecution 
are recorded as a judgment against the defendant in favor of the Commonwealth and execution may issue on that 
judgment in the same manner as on ay other monetary judgment, subject to a 20 year statute of limitations. Va. 
Code Ann. §§ 19.2-340, -341.
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188  See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Lynn Baas, Senior Court Clerk Dep’t Head, N.Y. County Clerk’s Office (June 
7, 2010) (in New York, debt judgment filed in clerk’s office and becomes public information that credit agencies 
have access to); Telephone Interview with Judy Lockhart, Chief of Fiscal Servs., Oakland County Executive Office, 
Michigan (June 7, 2010) (same in Michigan). 
189  Arizona: See Telephone Interview with Kristie Weegan, Dir., Admin. Office of the Courts, Ariz. Supreme Court 
(Nov. 23, 2009) (under Arizona’s Fines Fees and Restitution Enforcement Program (FARE), private contractors 
report individuals with unpaid debt to credit bureaus); Telephone Interview with Kim Knox, Supervisor, Maricopa 
County Department of Finance, Collections Unit (Nov. 19, 2009) (if a person fails to pay for 120 days, the county 
clerk directs a private collection agency to begin collection efforts, which includes credit reporting).  California: 
See Telephone Interview with Phil Dube, Los Angeles County Defender (Nov. 18, 2009) (Los Angeles County 
uses private company for collecting debt from traffic-related offenses, and this company can report information to 
credit reporting agencies.  Illinois: See Telephone Interview with Suzy Choi, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Clerk of the 
Circuit Court of Cook County (July 6, 2010) (court clerks refer unpaid criminal justice debt to a private collection 
company, which reports the debt to credit bureaus after 30 days).  Virginia: See Telephone Interview with Susan 
Hopkins, Clerk, Louisa Circuit Court (Jan. 4, 2010) (individuals who fail to pay criminal justice debt may be 
subject to the efforts of private collection agencies, including credit reporting).  
190  See What Is A Credit Bureau Score And How Do lenders Use Them?, 100 Questions & Answers About Buying A 
New Home, (last visited June 20, 2010), http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/buying/buyhm.cfm..
191  Allan Appel, 12 Ex-Offenders Will Get Public Apartments, New Haven Indep., Mar. 17, 2010, http://
newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/ex-offenders_gain_access_to_public_housing/.
192  Special Comm. on Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Re-Entry and 
Reintegration: The Road to Public Safety 177 (2006) (noting that 35 percent of employers ran credit checks of 
applicants in 2003, up from 19 percent in 1996) (citing Susan R. Hobbs, Employee Background Checking Seen as 
Staple in Today’s Job Environment, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA, Arlington, Va.), May 3, 2004, No. 84, at S-7).
193  Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 16: Employment Background Checks: A Jobseeker’s Guide (April 
2010), http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs16-bck.htm; see also Jonathan D. Glater, Another Hurdle for the Jobless: Credit 
Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/business/07credit.
html?hp=&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1249624822-AdNTN6kxyhaWwYGWQhdODQ (“Employers, often winnowing 
a big pool of job applicants in days of nearly 10 percent unemployment, view the credit check as a valuable tool for 
assessing someone’s judgment.”).  Some states have passed statutes prohibiting credit checks as part of employment 
background checks.  For example, Oregon has banned the use of credit histories in evaluating an applicant or 
discriminating against an applicant or employee in any way, with specific exceptions for employers such as banks or 
credit unions  2010 Or. Laws 102 (to be codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.885).
194  See e.g. N.Y. Correct. Law §§ 752 to 753 (limiting the use of prior convictions in employment decisions and 
requiring employers to consider “the state’s public policy of encouraging employment of previously convicted 
persons”).  
195  Rachel L. McLean & Michael D. Thompson, Council of State Gov’ts Justice Ctr., Repaying Debts 8 
(2007), available at: http://www.reentrypolicy.org/jc_publications/repaying_debts_full_report/RepayingDebts_
Guide_v13.pdf.
196  Alabama: See Ala. R. Crim. P. 26.11(h)(4) (court may “[o]rder an employer to withhold amounts from wages 
to pay fines and/or restitution”); see also Telephone Interview with Brian Barnett, Restitution Recovery Unit of 
Tuscaloosa County Dist. Attorney’s Office (Nov. 5, 2009) (wage garnishment commonly used in Tuscaloosa 
County).  But see Telephone Interview with Brandy (last name withheld upon request), Morgan County Restitution 
Recovery Officer, Morgan County Dist. Attorney’s Office (Nov. 5, 2009) (wage garnishment not used in Morgan 
County).  Arizona: See Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-804(J) (“A restitution lien shall be created in favor of the state for 
the total amount of the restitution, fine, surcharges, assessments, costs, incarceration costs and fees ordered, if 
any.”); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-806 (if filed with the appropriate agency, a restitution lien creates an interest in 
favor of the state or victim in the defendant’s real and personal property); Telephone Interview with Kim Knox, 
Supervisor, Maricopa County Dep’t of Fin. Collections Unit (Nov. 19, 2009) (Maricopa County refers unpaid 
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debts to collection agencies, which engage in collection efforts that can include wage garnishment).  California: 
See State of California Franchise Tax Board, Court-Ordered Debt – Frequently Asked Questions (Debtor), http://
www.ftb.ca.gov/online/Court_Ordered_Debt/faq_debtor.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2010) (describing use of 
wage and account garnishment to collect criminal justice debt); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1202.42 (permitting 
income deductions for collection of restitution); Cal. Penal Code § 987.8(a) (to reimburse costs of providing 
legal assistance, court may impose a lien on defendant’s real property that can be enforced by way of attachment, 
except that it cannot be enforced through a writ of execution on a defendant’s principal place of residence).  Florida: 
See Fla. Office of Program Policy Analysis & Gov’t Accountability, Clerks of Court Generally Are 
Meeting the System’s Collection Performance Standards 4 (2007) (most clerks use liens as a collection 
method and some also garnish wages or bank accounts), available at www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0721rpt.
pdf; see also Fla. Stat. § 938.30(6) (court may enter a judgment on court-imposed financial obligations, which 
constitutes a civil lien against the debtors presently owned or after-acquired property).  Georgia: See Ga. Code 
Ann. § 17-10-20(c) (fines and restitution can be collected through levy, foreclosure, garnishment, and all other 
actions provided for the enforcement of judgments in Georgia) Ga. Code Ann.§ 42-8-34.2(a) (authorizing the 
collection of “arrearage . . . through issuance of a writ of fiera facias” from defendants for whom payment of fines, 
costs, and restitution is a condition of probation).  However, no one the Brennan Center interviewed knew of 
wage garnishment or liens being used in practice. Illinois: See 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/124A-10 (“The property, 
real and personal, of a person who is convicted of an offense shall be bound, and a lien is created on the property . 
. . of every offender, not exempt from the enforcement of a judgment or attachment, . . . to pay the fine and costs 
of prosecution.”); 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-9-4; 5/5-5-6(h) (judge may enter an order of withholding to collect 
fines and restitution).  Louisiana: The court can convert fees, fines, and restitution (and interest) into a judgment, 
which can be enforced in the same manner as a money judgment in a civil case, La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 
886(A), 895.1(A)(2)(a), including through garnishment, La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2411, and the seizure 
and sale of property, La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 2291.  Michigan: See Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.1k(4) (“The 
court may require the defendant to pay any fine, cost, or assessment ordered to be paid under this section by 
wage assignment.”); Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.1a(13) (“An order of restitution is a judgment and lien against all 
property of the defendant for the amount specified in the order of restitution.”); see also Telephone Interview with 
Judy Lockhart, Chief of Fiscal Services, Oakland County Executive (Dec. 21, 2009) (Oakland County utilizes wage 
and bank account garnishment).  Missouri: See Telephone Interview with Defender (name withheld upon request), 
Missouri (Nov. 24, 2009) (wage garnishment used for collection in her district).  But see Telephone Interview 
with Paul Fox, Director of Judicial Administration, St. Louis County Circuit Clerk’s Office (Nov. 30, 2009) (wage 
garnishment not used in St. Louis).  New York:  See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 420.10(6) (fines and restitution can 
be entered as a civil judgment); Collecting the Judgment, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/civil/collectingjudg.
shtml (describing garnishment and liens as civil collection options).  North Carolina: See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
7A-455(b) (the court must enter a judgment for the value of legal services provided to the defendant, which shall 
constitute a lien); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.38(a) (restitution orders in excess of $250 can be enforced in the 
same manner as a civil judgment); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1365 (unpaid fines and court costs may be docketed 
upon default, constituting a lien on the defendant’s real estate).  North Carolina law generally does not provide for 
wage garnishment for criminal justice debt.  See Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, Associate Counsel, North 
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (Nov. 20, 2009).  Ohio: See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.18(D) 
(fines, costs, and restitution can be collected through attachment of property and wage or account garnishment); 
see also Telephone Interview with Dan Horrigan, Summit County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 3, 2009) (after a year of 
non-payment, use garnishment, judgment liens, and attachment of property); Telephone Interview with Barbara 
Cannon, Deputy Clerk, Greene County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 2, 2009) (office occasionally garnishes wages). 
Pennsylvania: See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9728(b)(4) (criminal justice debt can be entered as a judgment upon 
the person or the person’s property); see also Telephone Interview with David Crowley, Chief Public Defender, 
Centre County (Oct. 23, 2009) (jurisdiction uses liens).  Texas: See Tex. Code  Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 43.07 
(providing for execution against a person’s property to collect fines and costs); Tex. Code  Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 
42.22(8) (providing for “restitution liens” to collect restitution and certain fines and costs, which can be perfected 
against real property, personal property, and motor vehicles.  Virginia: See Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-340, 341 (fines 
and costs constitute a judgment and may be executed in the same manner as any other monetary judgment); see also 
Telephone Interview with Diane Blackburn, Deputy Clerk, Buckingham Circuit Court (Dec. 28, 2009) (utilizes 
services of the Department of Taxation to garnish wages); Telephone Interview with Laura Rodgers, Deputy Clerk, 
Halifax Circuit Court (Jan. 5, 2010) (contract with private collector to garnish wages).
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197  Alabama: Alabama intercepts tax rebates in order to collect payments.  Intercepted returns go to local clerks to 
pay towards debt.  Telephone Interview with Brian Barnett, Restitution Recovery Unit, Dist. Attorney’s Office 
of Tuscaloosa County. (Nov. 5, 2009). Arizona: Arizona utilizes the TIP program, established by state statute, 
to recover funds that Arizona State taxpayers owe to the state or court by intercepting tax refunds and lottery 
winnings.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-1122(A) and 5-525(A).  California: Counties can participate in the 
Franchise Tax Board’s optional Court-Ordered Debt Collections Program under California Revenue and Taxation 
Code §§ 19280 and 18670.  This collection program has the ability to intercept state tax returns and lottery 
winnings.  See Marcus Nieto, Cal. Research Bureau, Cal. State Library, Who Pays for Penalty Assessment 
Programs in California? 26 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/03/06-003.pdf. Illinois: 
Circuit clerks can intercept state income tax returns in order to recover court costs and fees.  705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
105/27.2b.  Louisiana: See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 886(A).  Michigan: The treasury has a “debt referral 
program” through which it can offset tax refunds or other payments due from the state in circumstances where 
an individual owes fees or fines.  See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 12.133, 12.136.  Missouri: Tax intercepts are 
a common form of collection in Missouri.  Telephone Interview with Dewayne Perry, Dist. Defender, Dist. 30 
(Nov. 23, 2009). See also Telephone Interview with Defender (name withheld upon request), Missouri  (Nov. 24, 
2009) (adding that wage garnishment is used, as well).  North Carolina: The state intercepts tax refund checks for 
attorneys’ fees and restitution.  See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7A-321(b); Telephone Interview with Matt Osborne, 
Assoc. Counsel, N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts (Nov. 20, 2009).  Virginia: Under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
349(B), the Commonwealth’s attorney for a given jurisdiction is responsible for collection, and may use the services 
of the Department of Taxation to expedite collection.  Among other things, the Department runs a tax refund setoff 
program.  See Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-523.  Virtually all jurisdictions participate in the state income tax refund setoff 
program. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Laura Rodgers, Deputy Clerk, Halifax Circuit Court. (Jan. 5, 2010); 
Telephone Interview with Kerry Rohr, Clerk, Bristol Circuit Court (Dec. 28, 2009).
198  See Margy Waller, High Cost or High Opportunity Cost? Transportation and Family Economic Success, The Brookings 
Institution Policy Brief, Center on Children and Families, no. 35, Dec. 2005, available at http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2005/12poverty_waller/pb35.pdf; Sandra Gustitus et al., The Mobility 
Agenda, Access to Driving and License Suspension Policies for the Twenty-First Century Economy 
(2008).
199  Florida: See Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, The Hidden Costs of 
Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 6 (2010) (suspension of an individual’s driver’s license for failure to pay criminal 
justice debt is very common, and county clerks routinely request driver’s license suspensions without any prior 
determination of ability to pay).  Virginia: See Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-395(B) (“[W]hen any person is convicted 
of any violation of the law of the Commonwealth or of the United States or of any valid local ordinance and fails 
or refuses to provide for immediate payment in full of any fine, costs, forfeitures, restitution, or penalty lawfully 
assessed against him, or fails to make deferred payments or installment payments as ordered by the court, the court 
shall forthwith suspend the person’s privilege to drive a motor vehicle on the highways in the Commonwealth.”). 
In Lee County, Virginia, a defendant’s driver’s license can be suspended at show cause hearing after 30 days of 
delinquency.  Telephone Interview with Renee Howard, Deputy Clerk, Lee Circuit Court, Virginia (Jan. 5, 2010). 
In Halifax County, a defendant will not face show cause hearings if he makes any payment towards debt, but paying 
less than amount due will result in driver’s license suspension.  Telephone Interview with Laura Rodgers, Deputy 
Clerk, Halifax Circuit Court, Virginia (Jan. 5, 2010).
200  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, License Suspensions for Nondriving Offenses 34 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10217.pdf.  
201  See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
202  42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(9)(A). 
203  7 U.S.C. § 2015(k)(1). 
204  42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(9) (it shall be cause for immediate termination of the tenancy of a public housing tenant if the 
tenant is violating a condition of his or her probation or parole); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B)(v) (contracts to make 
assistance payments entered into by a public housing agency with an owner of existing housing units shall provide 
that violating a condition of probation or parole is cause for termination of tenancy).
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205 42 U.S.C. § 1382(e)(4)(A)(ii). 
206 602 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2010).
207  Brief for Empire Justice et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellant at 17-19, Clark v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 140 
(2d Cir. 2010) (No. 08-5801-cv) (describing how individuals in California and Florida lost benefits due to criminal 
justice debt warrants). 
208 Clark, 602 F.3d at 149. 
209 Telephone Interview with Jennifer Parish, Dir. Of Crim. Justice Advocacy, Urban Justice Center (June 28, 2010). 
210  Carl Reynolds et al., Tex. Office of Court Admin., A Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Restitution, 
and Child Support are Assessed and Collected from People Convicted of Crimes, Interim Report 8 
(2009), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/debts/pdf/TexasFinancialObligationsInterimReport.pdf.
211  42 U.S.C. § 666(b)(7).
212  Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.038(d).
213  See Brennan Center for Justice, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States (2006), available at www.
brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_47267.pdf.
214  Erika L. Wood & Neema Trivedi, Modern-Day Poll Tax: How Economic Sanctions Block Access to the Polls, 
Clearinghouse Rev. J. of Poverty L. & Pol’y, May-June 2007, at 32.
215  Alabama: Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1(a)(3) (must fully pay all fines, court costs, fees, and victim restitution).  Arizona: 
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-912(A)(2) (must pay “any fine or restitution imposed”).  Florida: Fla. R. Exec. Clem. 
5.E, 9.A.3 (must pay “all restitution”), available at https://fpc.state.fl.us/Policies/ExecClemency/ROEC04052007.
pdf.  Virginia:.Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth, Restoration of Rights, http://www.commonwealth.
virginia.gov/JudicialSystem/Clemency/RORLongApp.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (must pay “costs, fines, and/
or restitution”).
216  Georgia: Ga. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶ III (“No person who has been convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude 
may register, remain registered, or vote except upon completion of the sentence.”). Texas: Tex. Elec. Code Ann. 
§ 11.002(4)(A) (individuals convicted of a felony are qualified to vote after having “fully discharged the person’s 
sentence, including any term of incarceration, parole, or supervision, or completed a period of probation ordered 
by any court”).
217  See supra notes 170, 173, 176 (probation can be extended for failing to pay criminal justice debt in Louisiana, North 
Carolina, and Texas); Brennan Center for Justice, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws Across the United States (2006) 
(voting rights restored in Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas after completion of sentence, including prison, parole 
and probation), available at www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_47267.pdf. 
218 See supra note 118.
219  See, e.g., Ala. Code § 12-19-152 (except as provided elsewhere, fines collected in felony and misdemeanor cases 
are remitted to the State General Fund); § 12-19-154 (90 percent of docket fees collected in district and circuit 
courts for violation of municipal ordinances go to the State General Fund); Ariz. Rev. Stat § 41-1723 (all money 
received each year by the public safety equipment fund after the first $1.2 million goes to the state general fund); 
§ 36-2219.01(B)(5) (5.5 percent of money sent to the medical services enhancement fund is deposited in the state 
general fund); Cal. Penal Code § 1465.7(a)-(c) (a state surcharge of 20 percent levied on a defendant’s base fine 
is transmitted to the General Fund); Rebekah Diller, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, 
The Hidden Costs of Florida’s Criminal Justice Fees 6 (2010) (“Some fees [in Florida] go directly to the 
state’s general revenue fund to subsidize the state’s overall budget.”); Ga. Code Ann. § 42-8-34(d)(1)-(2) (imposing 
various fees to be deposited into the general fund of the state treasury, such as a monthly probation fee of $23); 705 
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Ill. Comp. Stat. 105/27.5 (41 percent of all fees, fines, costs and other penalties collected by a circuit court shall be 
disbursed into that county’s general corporate fund); Champaign County Admin. Servs., Champaign County 
FY2010 Budget 35 (2009), available at http://www.co.champaign.il.us/COUNTYBD/2010budget/fullbudget.
pdf (13 percent of Champaign County’s [Illinois] revenue comes from fees and fines); Mich. Comp. Laws § 
780.905 (assessing fees of $60 and $50 for those convicted of felonies or certain misdemeanors, respectively, 90 
percent of which is transmitted to the department of treasury); N.C. Const. art. IX, § 7(a) (“. . . the clear proceeds 
of all penalties and forfeitures and of all fines collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the 
State, shall belong to and remain in the several counties, and shall be faithfully appropriated and used exclusively 
for maintaining free public schools.); About Court Costs, http://www.nccourts.org/County/Moore/Costs/Default.
asp (last visited July 21, 2010) (“Except for certain fees that are devoted to specific uses, all superior and district 
court costs collected by the Judicial Department are paid into the State’s General Fund, as are appellate court fees.”); 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3571(a) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, the Commonwealth shall be entitled to 
receive all fines, forfeited recognizances and other forfeitures imposed, lost or forfeited, fees and costs which by law 
have heretofore been paid or credited to, or which by statute are payable or creditable to, the Commonwealth.”); 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.020(h) (35 percent of funds received as costs for DNA testing go to the state 
highway fund); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-353 (proceeds from fines collected for offenses against the Commonwealth 
are to be deposited into the State Literary Fund.)
220  See ABA Commission on State Court Funding, Black Letter Recommendations of the ABA Commission 
on State Court Funding: Report 7 (Aug. 2004) (stating that courts should have “a predictable general funding 
stream that is not tied to fee generation”); see also Conference of State Court Administrators, Position 
Paper on State Judicial Branch Budgets in Times of Fiscal Crisis 14 (2003), available at htp://cosca.ncsc.
dni.us/WhitePapers/BudgetWhitePaper.pdf (courts must guard against the perception that they are responsible for 
funding themselves) [hereinafter COSCA Position Paper].
221  See Conference of State Court Administrators, Standards Relating to Court Costs: Fees, Miscellaneous Charges and 
Surcharges, and a National Survey of Practice 6 (1986), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.
exe?CISOROOT=/financial&CISOPTR=81] (noting that the complexity of fees and surcharges imposed in confusing 
to court personnel and requires the maintenance of complex accounting systems); Robert Tobin, National Center for 
State Courts, Funding the State Courts: Issues and Approaches 50 (1996), available at http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/
cgibin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/financial&CISOPTR=5 (stating that “[i]t is beyond dispute that [the concept of 
self-supporting courts] is not consistent with judicial ethics or the demands of due process”)
222 Safety Net for Abused Persons v. Segura, 692 So.2d 1038, 1042 (La. 1997) (striking down three dollar filing fee 
 imposed in criminal and civil cases to fund domestic violence programs).
223 See State v. Lanclos, 980 So.2d 643 (La. 2008) (striking down five dollar traffic-violation fee that went to police as “a 
 tax to be levied improperly through the judicial system” because connection between law enforcement and court 
 system was too attenuated).
224  See Leslie Eaton, Judge Steps in for Poor Inmates Without Justice Since Hurricane, N.Y.Times (May 23, 2006), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/23/us/23court.html?scp=1&sq=poor%20inmates%20without%20
justice%20since&st=cse..
225  Paul Purpura, Cupboard Bare for Poor’s Legal Aid, Times Picayune, Nov. 2, 2005, at B-3, available at http://www.
nola.com/katrina/pages/110205/1102B03.pdf.  
226  See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 224; Peter Whoriskey, In New Orleans, Justice on Trial:  Katrina Strains Public Defender’s 
Office, Wash. Post (Apr. 15, 2006).
227 See Eaton, supra note 224.
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228  Alabama: Probation officers are involved in setting up payment plans Telephone Interview with Robert Oakes, 
Assistant Executive Director, Alabama Board of Pardons and Parole (November 2, 2009).  Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
§ 31-466(A) (parole or probation officer is required to monitor the collection of supervision fees).  California: 
Telephone Interview with Phil Dube, Assistant Public Defender, Los Angeles County Public Defender (Nov. 18, 
2009) (probation department is involved in dunning defendants into paying costs).  Telephone Interview with 
Gary Gibson, Deputy Public Defender, San Diego Public Defender (Dec.2, 2009) (Probation officers are the 
main interface in collections and judges are not involved in the process). Florida: If the sentencing court or Parole 
Commission has ordered a specific monthly payment amount, and the probationer fails to make that monthly 
payment, the probation officer must report the failure to pay to the court or commission.  E-mail from Shari 
Britton, Chief, Bureau of Probation & Parole Field Services, Florida Dept. of Corrs. to Rebekah Diller, Brennan 
Center (Jan. 14, 2008).  Georgia: Depending on what the judge orders, defendants make payments either to the 
clerk of the court or to the probation office. See Ga. Code Ann., § 42-8-34.1(f ) (stating that the sentencing judge 
has discretion to order payments made either to the clerk of the court or the probation office).  In either case, 
the probation officer oversees collection enforcement, because payment is a condition of probation.  Telephone 
interview with Claudia Saari, Interim Circuit Public Defender, DeKalb County, Georgia (Oct. 23, 2009); 
Telephone interview with Peter Wilson, Fiscal Technician in the Cobb County Clerk of Superior Court Office (Oct. 
9, 2009).  Illinois: Probation officers work out payment plans. Telephone Interview with Lester Finkle, Assistant 
Public Defender, Cook County (Oct. 30, 2009).  Louisiana: Probation officers and parole agencies are involved 
in collecting probation/parole related fees and fines.  Telephone Interview with Collections Department, New 
Orleans Criminal Court (Aug. 11, 2009).  Missouri:  Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 14, § 80-5.010(1)(I) (process for 
sanctions for nonpayment includes reminder from supervising officer, submission of violation report.    Michigan: 
Phone Interview with Paula Taylor, Finance Director, 17th Circuit Court (Kent County, Michigan) (Dec. 21, 2009) 
(financial obligations are normally a condition of probation and probation officers monitor payments and report 
failures to pay.); Phone Interview with Judy Lockhart, Chief of Fiscal Services, Oakland County Executive (Dec.21, 
2009) (For those with probation, payment is a condition of probation, and the probation office monitors failure to 
pay and reports violations).  New York: Probation agencies can be chosen by the courts to be the collection agency 
for the various financial obligations of defendants who are given sentences of probation.  Telephone Interview 
with Jay L. Wilber, Public Defender, Broome County (Dec. 1, 2009).  North Carolina: Telephone Interview with 
Matt Osborne, Associate Counsel, North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (Nov. 20, 2009) (Payment 
schedules are usually set up by the probation officer).  Ohio: Probation officers warn persons under supervision who 
have not paid that arrest warrant will be issued if payment is not made within a certain number of days.  Telephone 
Interview with Barbara Cannon, Deputy Clerk, Greene County Clerk of Courts (Nov. 2, 2009).  Pennsylvania: 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9728(a)(1) (“Except as provided in subsection (b)(5), all restitution, reparation, fees, costs, 
fines and penalties shall be collected by the county probation department or other agent designated by the county 
commissioners of the county with the approval of the president judge of the county for that purpose in any manner 
provided by law.”).  Texas: Carl Reynolds et al., Council of State Governments Justice Center, Texas Office of Court 
Administration, A Framework to Improve How Fines, Fees, Restitution, and Child Support are Assessed and Collection 
from People Convicted of Crimes:  Interim Report (2009), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/oca/debts/pdf/
TexasFinancialObligationsInterimReport.pdf. (Probation officers are involved in collecting financial information 
from defendants, setting up payment plans, collecting payments, and administering progressive sanctions.)  Virginia: 
Although probation officers do not have a formal role in the actual collection of fees, fines and restitution, they 
often assist in collection by threatening revocation, and much more rarely, actually initiating revocation proceedings 
for a failure to pay.  Telephone interview with Kerry Rohr, Clerk, Bristol Circuit Court, Virginia (Dec. 28, 2009); 
Telephone interview with Diane Blackburn, Deputy Clerk, Buckingham Circuit Court, Virginia (Dec. 28, 2009); 
Telephone Interview with Renee Howard, Deputy Clerk, Lee Circuit Court, Virginia (Jan. 5, 2010).
229  See, e.g. Telephone Interview with Barbara Cannon, Deputy Clerk, Greene County Clerk of Courts, Ohio (Nov. 
2, 2009) (Probation officers warn persons under supervision who have not paid that arrest warrant will be issued if 
payment is not made within a certain number of days); S. Ctr. for Human Rights, Profiting From the Poor: A 
Report on Predatory Probation Companies in Georgia 2 (2008) (discussing how private probation companies 
assigned to supervise misdemeanors threaten imprisonment and use other bullying tactics in order to collect fees), 
available at http://www.schr.org/files/profit_from_poor.pdf.   
230  Telephone interview with Walter Pulliam, Chief of Operations, Virginia Department of Corrections, Division of 
Community Corrections (Jan. 8, 2009).
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231  Id; Telephone interview with Richard Crossen, Virginia Department of Corrections, Community Corrections 
Manager (Jan. 12, 2009).
232  Telephone interview with Walter Pulliam, Chief of Operations, Virginia Department of Corrections, Division of 
Community Corrections (Jan. 8, 2009).
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